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The Community Rating System (CRS) was introduced to encourage flood
mitigation and increase National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) participation via
premium discounts. It is not clear, however, how additional mitigation and premium
discounts affect NFIP participation and damage claims payments.
We employ matching methods and log-linear regression framework to estimate
the impact of CRS participation (versus non-participation) on outcomes. We also analyze
the effect of individual CRS mitigation activities on outcomes. We do so while
controlling for key geospatial, socioeconomic, and time effects.
Results show a positive and significant effect of CRS participation on NFIP
participation, but no significant effect on damage claims payments. Outreach and flood
data maintenance activities have positive effect on NFIP participation while floodplain
mapping and flood protection have negative effect. Flood protection information and
storm water management have negative effect on damage claims payments while
floodplain management planning and acquisition and relocation have positive effect.
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INTRODUCTION
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was created in 1968 to provide
assistance to communities and homeowners by identifying risk, managing floodplains,
and providing residents with affordable flood insurance (Brody et al. 2013). Property
owners can participate in the NFIP by purchasing flood insurance policies given that their
communities are participating in the NFIP. A Community’s participation in the NFIP
implies undertaking some standard flood mitigation activities, including enforcement of
building and zoning ordinances (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
2015).
The NFIP has seen several reforms over the years aimed at either increasing
participation (especially in terms of homeowner’s purchase of flood insurance policy), or
reducing insured damage claims, or both. For example, in 1973, property owners with
federally-backed mortgages were mandated to purchase flood insurance if the property is
located in a special flood hazard area (SFHA). The year 1983 saw the introduction of the
write-your-own program which allowed insurance companies to write and market flood
insurance policies. The Community Rating System (CRS) was introduced into the NFIP
program in 1990. In 1995, FEMA also introduced the “Cover America” program, a
campaign that promoted awareness of flood risk (Michel-Kerjan 2010). In the year 2004,
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was reformed. The reform was to ensure that
1

losses to properties for which claims payments have been made on several instances are
reduced (FEMA 2016). Some specifics to this reform were the introduction of a pilot
flood mitigation program for properties experiencing higher damages, and also FEMA to
fund flood mitigation activities for these properties (FEMA 2016). The year 2012 saw
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance and Modernization Act introduced to NFIP (Center
for Insurance Policy and Research 2012; FEMA 2016). This reform aimed at
restructuring premium rates, enforce the compulsory flood policy purchase for federallybacked mortgages and also address issues of mitigation among others. In 2014, the
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance and Modernization Act was replaced with the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. This legislation seeks to reduce
premium rates on selected policies and also cancel some rate increases that had
previously been implemented (FEMA 2016).
In this research, we focus on the CRS. The goal of the CRS program is to
encourage both local hazard mitigation activities (Petrolia, Landry, and Coble 2013) and
also increase NFIP participation (i.e., increase policies-in-force) among CRS
participating communities. Under the CRS program, there are 19 credit-generating flood
mitigation activities organized under four general categories called “series”, labeled
Series 300, 400,500, and 600, respectively. Series 300 activities are related to providing
information on floods to community residents, information on Flood Insurance Rate Map
(FIRM) to community residents and promoting flood insurance purchases. Series 400
activities focus on floodplain mapping. These activities involve developing new flood
elevations, and delineating floodways for areas not mapped on FIRMs. Series 400
activities are related to the enforcement of building regulations, especially to new
2

developments. Series 500 activities are related to flood damage reduction to existing
developments. For example, under series 500, CRS communities undertake drainage
system maintenance and floodplain management. Series 600 activities focus on
providing flood warnings, how to respond to emergencies during flood, providing
maintenance to levees, and ensuring dam safety (FEMA 2013).
An NFIP community can undertake none, some, or all of these 19 CRS activities
and earn program credits according to the degree to which each activity is undertaken.
First, an NFIP community performs a self-assessment to determine if its level of
mitigation exceeds the NFIP minimum. It then applies to the CRS program for the CRS
program to access the degree of mitigation practices. Should CRS officials be satisfied
that the community’s mitigation practices exceeds the base-level flood migration, then
the community residents (i.e., individual property owners, including businesses) get an
opportunity to earn premium discount on individual policy. A higher degree of flood
mitigation (higher CRS overall points) will earn a higher percentage discount on
individual flood policy premia. Specific details of the program will be discussed in
Chapter 2.
Despite the benefits to participating communities and their residents, the CRS
program has suffered from low participation since its inception. Of the over 22,000 NFIP
communities, only 5% of these communities also participate in the CRS program (FEMA
2016). Studies that have researched the likelihood of a community to participate in the
CRS program have shown that characteristics spanning from hydrology of the
community to socio-economics of the community’s residents may influence
communities’ participation in the CRS program (Brody et al. 2009; Landry and Li 2012;
3

Sadiq and Noonan 2015). On the other hand, out of the total 5,583,461 NFIP policies-inforce in the US, 3,779,513 (68%) are in CRS-participating communities (FEMA 2016).
Thus, although few NFIP communities are participating in the CRS program, more than
two thirds of NFIP policies-in-force are in CRS participating communities.
Although the CRS program aims to encourage NFIP participation and reduce
future flood damages, it is not clear if and to what degree participation in the CRS
actually affects outcomes. Past research that have looked into this question have
analyzed the effect of overall CRS credit points on NFIP participation (Zahran et al.
2009), how the degree of CRS mitigation practice affects the proportion of magnitude of
claims (i.e., magnitude of claims divided by coverage purchased, and magnitude of
claims divided by property value) (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010), and the relationship
between specific CRS mitigation activities and damage claims payments (Highfield and
Brody 2013). On the other hand, Brody et al. (2007) have looked at how the degree of
CRS mitigation practice affects flood damages (measured as the dollar value of total
losses form flood events). Zahran et al. (2009) finds a positive and a significant
relationship between overall CRS credit points and NFIP policies-in-force. In their study,
control variables such as median home value, college educated, floodplain, coastal
county, flood frequency, and flood property damage were also positive and significant in
explaining NFIP policies-in-force. Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) finds a negative
relationship between higher degree of CRS mitigation practice and the dependent
variables (i.e., magnitude of claims divided by coverage purchased, and magnitude of
claims divided by property value). Control variables such as the number of floors a
house has, building elevation, basement, and the location of the house (Special Flood
4

Hazard Area/ Non-Special Flood Hazard Area) were also negative and statistically
significant in explaining the proportion of magnitude of damage claims payments.
Highfield and Brody (2013) find a negative relationship between some specific CRS
mitigation activities and damage claims payments. Control variables (floodplain area,
soil permeability, precipitation, surge event, and population) used in their study was also
statistically significant in explaining damage claims payments. In Brody et al. (2007)
study, results show a negative relationship between flood damage and the degree of CRS
mitigation practice of counties.
However, with the exception of Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) who looked at
the discrete impact of different degrees of CRS mitigation practice on outcomes, these
past studies have focused mostly on within CRS-participating communities, i.e., how
marginal increases in overall CRS credit points affects either NFIP participation
(policies-in-force), damage claims payments, or flood damages. Past studies have mostly
used only control variables to isolate the effect of CRS on outcomes whiles focusing on
within CRS communities. That is, to the best of our knowledge, no study has tried to
isolate the treatment effect of CRS participation (versus non-participation) on outcomes
using matching methods. The above-mentioned studies (except Michel-Kerjan and
Kousky 2010; Highfield and Brody 2013) have also used county-level data. However,
results at the county-level might not apply to individual NFIP communities. Also, with
the exception of Highfield and Brody (2013), past studies have concentrated on the state
of Florida (Brody et al. 2007; Zahran et al. 2009; Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010), and
Texas (Brody et al. 2007). That is, their findings may not apply to other states. Although
Highfield and Brody (2013) considered a sample of CRS participating communities
5

across the U.S., they only looked at the effects of specific CRS activities on damage
claims payments. In addition, the longest and recent time frame past research have
considered is the period 1999 to 2009.
In this present research, we depart from earlier studies by looking at the discrete
impact of CRS participation versus non-participation on NFIP participation (policies-inforce), and damage claims payments. Like past studies, we also control for key
geospatial and socioeconomic variables. However, we also contribute to the literature by
controlling for variables that were not accounted for in past studies, including percent of
land area in specific flood zones. Our study area focuses on NFIP communities in
Alabama, and Mississippi of which little is known. We use more current communitylevel panel data (1994 to 2013) in our research.
In estimating the impact of a program on outcomes, it is suggested that for
comparison, the units that received the program, and those that did not receive the
program should share similar characteristics so as to eliminate program selection bias
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Rubin and Thomas 2000; Stuart and Greene 2008). To
accomplish this, the literature suggests using matching methods (Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983; Rubin and Thomas 2000; Stuart and Green 2008). Matching seeks to find from a
pool of nonparticipating units (in our case, non-CRS communities), candidates that have
similar characteristics as that of the participating units (in our case CRS participating
communities). That is, to estimate the discrete impact of CRS participation versus nonparticipation on outcomes, we employ matching methods in selecting non-CRS
participating communities. This is an addition to existing literature as past studies that
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have answered the question as to if and to what degree participation in the CRS affects
outcomes have not employed matching in their studies.
In a different analysis, we estimate the effect of community-level specific CRS
mitigation activities on both NFIP participation and damage claims payments. Highfield
and Brody (2013) only looked at the effect of community-level specific CRS mitigation
activities on damage claims payments (they did not consider the effect on NFIP
participation). Also, Highfield and Brody (2013) only looked at some selected activities.
This current research provides estimates on the discrete impact of CRS
participation (versus non-participation) on NFIP participation (policies-in-force) and
damage claims payments. Also in this research, analysis on the effect of individual CRS
mitigation activities on NFIP participation and on damage claims payments is provided.

7

THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP), AND COMMUNITY
RATING SYSTEM (CRS)
In this chapter, we present an overview of the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP), and the Community Rating System (CRS). We also look at some factors
affecting CRS participation.
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
Flood insurance was not widely available to individuals prior to 1968, due in part
to selection and high costs of servicing claims when a major flood disaster occurred
(Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010). The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
introduced the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to provide flood insurance to
individuals and businesses. In 1983 the “Write-Your-Own” program was introduced,
which gave private insurance companies the authority (by FEMA) to prepare and market
flood insurance policies, although the federal government retains, responsibility for the
settling claims (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010; Michel-Kerjan 2010).
Flood-risk designation is accomplished via Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs),
produced by the US Army Corps of Engineers. On the FIRMs, flood risks are classified
into two distinct categories: the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) and the area outside
of the SFHA, referred to here as the Non-SFHA. As the names imply, SFHA includes
high risk areas and the Non-SFHA includes moderate-to-low risk areas. In specific
8

terms, the SFHA is the land area covered by the floodwaters of the “base flood” on
FIRMs. The “base flood” is the flood having a one percent chance of being equaled or
exceeded in any given year. This is the regulatory standard, also referred to as the "100year flood," and the SFHA is thus also referred to as the “100-year flood zone”. The base
flood is the national standard used by the NFIP and all federal agencies for the purposes
of requiring the purchase of flood insurance and regulating new development. Base
Flood Elevation (BFE), which is the computed elevation to which floodwater is
anticipated to rise during the base flood, is typically shown on FIRMs.
The SFHA is further delineated into specific “zones”, including Zones A, AO,
AH, A1-30, AE, A99, AR, AR/A1-30, AR/AE, AR/AO, AR/AH, AR/A, VO, V1-30, VE,
and V. V zones (all the aforementioned zones beginning with the letter “V”) are coastal
high hazard areas that experience high-velocity wave action (i.e., storm surge), and A
zones (those beginning with the letter “A”) are inland high hazard areas.
Specific zones outside of the SFHA, i.e., the Non-SFHA zones, include B, C, X
(shaded and unshaded), and D zones. Zones B and X (shaded) are moderate flood hazard
areas, whose risk falls between the limits of the base flood and the 0.2-percent-annualchance (or 500-year) flood. Zone C and X (unshaded) are minimal flood hazard areas
with elevation above the 0.2-percent-annual-chance (or 500-year) flood. Zone D is used
for areas where there are possible but undetermined flood hazards, or where a community
incorporates portions of another community’s area where no map has been prepared
(FEMA 2016).
Properties located in flood risk areas that are not mapped onto the FIRM (preFIRM), i.e., where no flood maps exist, are eligible to receive subsidized flood insurance
9

policies until FIRMs are created. For areas located on the FIRM, strict building
ordinances and actuarial flood insurance rates apply to new developments (Kunreuther
and White 1994; Adelle and Leichenko 2011). NFIP policies come in two forms, the
actuarial policies and the discounted policies. About a quarter of the entire NFIP policy
rates are subsidized on pre-FIRM bases (Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 2012). Flood
insurance premiums vary across flood zones, but are individually adjusted for community
residents depending on building characteristics such as elevation above base flood and
the community’s involvement in local flood mitigation activities.
NFIP participation is compulsory for properties located in SFHAs that have
federally-backed mortgages. The compulsory purchase of flood insurance policies was
enacted by the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 in response to Hurricane Agnes,
which struck the Atlantic Coast in 1972, and revealed that most community residents,
especially those in SFHAs did not have flood insurance (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky
2010). Other reforms to the NFIP have evolved over the years with the idea of increasing
NFIP participation (policies-in-force): Cover America in 1995, Flood Insurance Reform
and Modernization Act in 2007, and Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of
2014. In 1990 the NFIP introduced the Community Rating System program to encourage
both local flood mitigation activity and NFIP participation.
The Community Rating System (CRS) program
To participate in the CRS program, a community must first be a participant of the
National Flood Insurance program (NFIP). Participation in the CRS is voluntary. A
community’s participation in the CRS gives its residents an opportunity to earn premium
discounts on their individual policies. Thus the CRS links community-level flood
10

mitigation with household-level NFIP participation. CRS participating communities
undertake flood mitigation activities that exceed the standard NFIP mitigation practices at
the community-level. In general, flood mitigation activities may take a structural or nonstructural form. Structural forms are centered on large-scale construction to include but
not limited to, seawalls and channels, while the non-structural form address plans and
policies such as land use planning tools, flood insurance, education and training, and
emergency and recovery policies (Highfield and Brody 2013). Communities’ preferences
for the two forms of flood mitigation activities has been shown to be a function of the
cost involved in undertaking these activities. Highfield and Brody (2013) make the claim
that CRS is more skewed toward non-structural techniques of flood mitigation. In a
study by Brody et al. (2009), it was found that local jurisdictions in Florida and Texas use
more non-structural flood mitigation techniques compared to the structural techniques.
However, Brody, Kang, and Bernhardt (2010) also note that Florida’s measures of flood
mitigation are more of the non-structural approach compared to that of Texas.
Table 2.1 contains a summary of the 19 individuals CRS activities. The activities
are such that those categorized under series 300 (public information) are to motivate
flood insurance purchase and also provide information to community residents as to how
to reduce flood damages. Series 400 activities (mapping and regulations) involves
mapping of areas onto FIRMs, protecting floodplains, managing storm water, and
ensuring higher standard regulations. Activities under series 500 (flood damage
reduction) involve the adoption of good floodplain management plans, relocating floodprone structures, and maintaining community drainage systems. Series 600 activities
(warning and response) seek to provide warnings of possible floods, and also respond to
11

flood events so as to minimize loss of life and property. Depending on the degree to
which participating communities undertake these activities, communities are awarded
credit points up to the maximum allowed for each activity.

12

Table 2.1

Community Rating System (CRS) Activities and Credit points

Series

Creditable Activities
Elevation Certificates
Map Information Service
Outreach Projects
Hazard disclosure
Flood Protection
Information
Flood Protection
Assistance
Flood insurance
Promotion

c310
c320
c330
c340
c350

Maximum
Activity
credit points
116
90
350
80
125

c360

110

c370

110

400: Mapping and
Regulations
CRS awards credit to
communities that enact and
enforce regulations
exceeding NFIP’s minimum
standards so as to provide
flood protection for new
development

Floodplain Mapping
Open Space Preservation
Higher Regulatory
Standards
Flood Data Maintenance
Storm Water Management

c410
c420
c430

802
2020
2042

c440
c450

222
755

500: Flood Damage
Reduction
To complement series 400,
activities for this series
addresses flood damage to
existing buildings

Floodplain Management
Planning
Acquisition and
Relocation
Flood Protection
Drainage System
Maintenance

300: Public information
Credit is given for local
activities that advice
residents on flood hazard,
flood insurance and flood
protection measures

Flood Warning and
600: Warning and
Response
Response
Activities under this series
Levee Safety
aim at reducing the effect of Dam Safety
floods on people, property
and building content
Source: NFIP CRS Coordinator’s Manual (2013)

Activity
Number

c510

622

c520

2250

c530
c540

1600
570

c610

395

c620
c630

235
160

Communities are rated based on the overall CRS credit points they receive for
practicing CRS mitigation activities, ranging from 10 (lowest level of participation) to 1
13

(highest). For every 500–point-increment in overall credit points, the CRS class
improves (decreases). In most cases, NFIP communities that enter the CRS program for
the first time are rated as class 9 (FEMA 2015), but those that do not earn at least 500
points are eventually re-classified as class 10. Class 10 communities are not eligible for
premium discounts, and are classified as non-participating communities.
Table 2.2 reports the premium discounts associated with each CRS class, which
differs for SFHA and non-SFHAs. Policy discounts range from 0% to 45%, in 5%
increments for residents located in SFHAs. For residents in non-SFHAs, the policy
discount is 10% if the community receives a class rating of 1 through 6. For
communities rated class 7 through 9, residents in non-SFHAs receive a 5% discount1.

1

Community residents in flood zones B, C, and X with Preferred Risk Policies do not
receive CRS premium discounts (FEMA, 2016). Residents of Emergency Program
communities are also not eligible for CRS premium discounts
14

Table 2.2

CRS Credit Points Earned, Classification Awarded, and Premium
Discounts

Classes

Overall CRS points
4,500+

Discount (%) in
SFHA
45

Discount (%) in
Non-SFHA
10

1
2

4,000 – 4,499

40

10

3

3,500 – 3,999

35

10

4

3,000 – 3,499

30

10

5

2,500 – 2,999

25

10

6

2,000 – 2,499

20

10

7

1,500 – 1,999

15

5

8

1,000 – 1,499

10

5

9

500 – 999

5

5

10

499 and below

0

0

Source: NFIP CRS Coordinator’s Manual (2013)
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STUDY AREA AND DATA
In this chapter, we focus on the study area of the research, the data used to inform
the analysis, and how the data were processed for analysis.
Study area
NFIP communities in the states of Alabama and Mississippi are the focus. The
total number of NFIP policies-in-force in Alabama in 2013 was 58,383 of which 32,519
were from CRS participating communities2. Mississippi had a total of 74,299 policies-inforce, out of which 52,866 were from CRS participating communities. In Alabama, 12
out of 428 NFIP communities participate in the CRS program while in Mississippi 31 out
of 330 NFIP communities participate (FEMA 2013). In Figure 3.1, we show the
distribution of CRS participation by communities in Alabama and Mississippi.
Participation in the CRS is indicated by the color green. Although both coastal and
noncoastal communities participate in the CRS program, there is greater participation
density in the coastal areas. We focus on Alabama and Mississippi as the project is
funded by the MS-AL Sea Grant Consortium (MASGC). Having said this, there are
other reasons that make these states good candidates for analysis. First, Alabama and
2

An NFIP “community” may be an incorporated city, town, township, borough or
village, any incorporated area of a county, or an entire county. It is simply a distinct
geographical entity for the purpose of administering the NFIP and CRS program in that
locality. In some places, an entire county is a “community”, whereas in others, a county
contains multiple “communities”, depending on the need of the program.
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Mississippi are coastal states which make them vulnerable to storm-surge related floods.
Also Alabama and Mississippi were known to be part of five states (i.e., Texas, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama) with high damage claims payments (Bin, Bishop,
and Kousky 2012).
This high damage claims payments could be as a result of Hurricane Katrina
which occurred in 2005. Moreover, unlike Florida and Texas, no study has been
conducted to find out the effect of CRS on NFIP participation and damage claims
payments in these two states. Although Highfield and Brody (2013) considered Alabama
and Mississippi in their sample for CRS communities, its focus of analysis did not
consider NFIP participation.
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Figure 3.1

A map showing CRS participation across Alabama and Mississippi

Source: John Cartwright, Geosystems Research Institute, Mississippi State University
Data and Variables
Two separate community-level panel data sets were utilized in our study. First, to
estimate the effect of community-level CRS participation (versus non-participation) on
household-level NFIP participation (as measured by policies-in-force), and damage
claims (as measured by damage claims payments), we used data for the period 19942013. Second, to estimate the effect of specific community-level CRS mitigation
activities (among CRS-participating communities only) on household-level NFIP
participation and damage claims, we use data for the period 1998-2013. These time
periods were chosen for the following reasons. First, although the CRS program began in
1990, the early years of the program were more of an experimental stage to establish the
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viability of the program (Pat Skinner, personal communication, March 22, 2016). Thus
participation in the early years was very low (Highfield and Brody 2013). Also the
period from 1998 to 2013 was considered in estimating the effect of specific CRS
mitigation activities because of lack of available data on specific CRS mitigation
activities on earlier years. Data on NFIP were obtained from Janice Mitchell FEMA
Region 4 office. CRS data were also obtained from Bill Lesser, FEMA CRS coordinator.
Data on geospatial variables and socioeconomic variables (for the periods 2000-2013)
were also obtained by John Cartwright (Geosystems Research Institute, Mississippi State
University). Specifically, Cartwright’s geospatial data were from the US Geological
Survey (U.S. Geological Survey 2015) and PRISM Climate Group (PRISM Climate
Group 2015). Data on socioeconomic variables for the other periods (1991-2009) were
obtained from the American Community Survey (American Community Survey 2015).
Dependent Variables
NFIP policies-in-force
Annual data on the number of NFIP policies-in-force were obtained from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2015) (Janice Mitchell, FEMA Region
4). NFIP policies-in-force was measured as the annual total number of NFIP policies-inforce recorded for an NFIP community. The distribution of the number of policies-inforce variable was not normal (i.e., skewness = 5.493, kurtosis = 37.427, and Shapiro
Wilk normality test of 0.333 (p-value of 0.000)). Hence we log transformed to
approximate a normal distribution.
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Damage claims payment
We obtain data on damage claims payments from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA 2015) (i.e., specifically, from Janice Mitchell FEMA
Region 4). We measure damage claims payment as the total dollar amount of damage
claims payments recorded for a given NFIP community in a given year. Similar to the
policies-in-force variable, the damage claims payments variable had a skewness of
23.974, kurtosis of 641.637, and a Shapiro-Wilk test of 0.051 (p-value of 0.000). As
such, we log transform this variable to approximate a normal distribution.
Independent Variables
Our independent variables can generally be grouped into three: our treatmentCRS variables, geospatial controls, and socioeconomic controls. For our CRS variables,
we have CRS participation and specific CRS mitigation activities.
CRS variables
CRS participation
To estimate the effect of CRS participation versus nonparticipation on outcomes,
our independent variable of interest is CRS participation. This is measured as a binary
variable that is equal to 1 if an NFIP community is participating in the CRS program in a
given year and 0 otherwise. A community’s participation in CRS is based on the year in
which a community enters the program. With the exception of one community (Decatur
in Alabama) that dropped out of the CRS program in 2006, communities did not enter,
exit, and re-enter the program. As mentioned earlier, since early years of the program
were experimental, we consider years after 1993
20

Community-Level Specific CRS Mitigation Activities
To estimate the effect of community-level specific CRS mitigation activities on
outcomes, a vector of community-level specific CRS mitigation activities is used as our
independent variables of interest. Data on community-level specific CRS mitigation
activity were obtained from FEMA (2015) (Janice Mitchell FEMA Region 4). Out of the
19 specific CRS mitigation activities, we concentrate on 17 specific CRS mitigation
activities. We drop the flood insurance promotion (c370) activity from our analysis
because there were no data available on this activity for the periods considered in this
research. The levee safety (c620) activity was dropped because there were no variations
in levee safety data. The activities retained are elevation certificate (c310), map
information service (c320), outreach projects (c330), hazard disclosure (c340), flood
protection information (c350), flood protection assistance (c360), floodplain mapping
(c410), open space preservation (c420), higher regulatory standards (c430), flood data
maintenance (c450), floodplain management planning (c510), acquisition and relocation
(c520), flood protection (c530), drainage system maintenance (c540), flood warning and
response (c610), and dams (c630). Specific CRS mitigation activities were measured
according to the points a community receives by FEMA for undertaking each activity.
This variable is scaled (divided) by 100 in all econometric models. Specific CRS
mitigation activity points were further divided by 100.
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Geospatial variables
Mississippi
Mississippi is defined as 1 if an NFIP community is in Mississippi and 0
otherwise (Alabama). We identify a community in Mississippi and Alabama based on
the state code associated with the community.
Coast
Coast is defined as 1 if an NFIP community is a coastal community and 0 if
otherwise. We identify an NFIP community as a coastal community if the community is
in a coastal county. The identification of a county as a costal county is based on the
National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) classification of a coastal
community for census purpose (US Census Bereuau 2016).
Slope
We utilize mean value of the slope variable in this research. The database from
which the mean was computed was the National Elevation dataset (U.S. Geological
Survey 2015). The slope variable was measured in degrees. It was calculated as the
maximum rate of change from a given grid cell to its neighbors. Lower slope values
depict flatter areas and higher slope values show steeper area. Data on slope were
measured at the community-level based on a 4 kilometer grid cell. Mean value was
computed by John Cartwright using the zonal statistics of the ArcGIS software.
Stream density
We make use of the mean value of stream density. Data from the National
Hydrography dataset (U.S. Geological Survey 2015) was used in computing mean value.
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Stream density was measured as the length of a stream divided by the square kilometers
of an area. The stream density variable was measured at the community-level, and was
based on a 4 kilometer grid cell. The computation was done by John Cartwright using
the zonal statistics of the ArcGIS software. We convert the unit scale of stream density
from squares kilometers to square miles by multiplying the square kilometer value by
1.609344.
Elevation
Data on elevation were from the National Elevation dataset (U.S. Geological
Survey 2015). This was originally measured in meters above sea level as the highest
point of community. However, we convert from meters to feet by multiplying the meters
values by 3.2808399. Measurement was at the community-level. Data on elevation were
on 4 kilometer grid cell bases. The mean values of the elevation were calculated by John
Cartwright using the zonal statistics of the ArcGIS software. The elevation variable was
further scaled (divide) by 100.
Precipitation
We utilize the PRISM Climate group database (PRISM Climate Group 2015) in
computing the mean values of precipitation. The precipitation variable was measured as
the annual amount of rainfall a community receives in millimeters. We convert from
millimeters to inches by multiplying by 0.03937008. Data on precipitation were based on
a 4 kilometer grid cell. The zonal statistics of the ArcGIS software was used in
computing the mean values.
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Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)
Data on these flood zones were obtained from FEMA (2016). We specify the
variable SFHA as a combination of all “A” and “V” flood zones, which includes, A, AE,
AO, AH, and VE. The flood zones were measured as the percent of land area in a
community classified as located in the respective flood zones.
Non-Special Flood Hazard Area (Non-SFHA)
We use data from FEMA (2016): to measure the Non-SFHA variable. This
variable was a combination of flood zones B and C. Similar to the SFHA variable, we
measure the flood zones as the percent of land area in a community classified as flood
zone B or C.
Socioeconomic Variables
Coverage
This is the amount of coverage that a policy covers. This variable is measured in
US dollars. Data on coverage were obtained from FEMA (2015) (Janice Mitchell,
FEMA Region 4). We further scale (divide) by 10,000,000 and log transform to
approximate a normal distribution.
Education
We use percent college educated in a community. Data on percent college
educated were from two sources. That is, the years 1994-2009 data were from the 1990
and 2000 US Census Bureau (2015). For the years 2010-2013, we calculate percent
college educated as total number of people in a community with either a bachelor’s,
master’s, professional, or doctorate degree, divided by the population and multiplied by
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100. Data used in computing percent college educated were from the American
Community Survey (2015). The American Community Survey data were obtained by
John Cartwright.
Household income
The household income variable was measured in US dollars. The years 19942009 median income data were from the 1990 and 2000 US Census Bureau (2015). The
years 2010-2013 household income data which were obtained by John Cartwright were
from the American Community Survey (2015). The household income variable was
further scaled (divided) by 1000.
Number of households
For 1994-2009 we use data from the 1990 and 2000 US Census Bureau (2015).
For the years 2010-2013, we use data from the American Community Survey (2015).
Data on number of households were at the community-level. Where an NFIP community
bears the name of a county and within the county there is another NFIP community (a
city or a town, etc.), we subtract the city or town’s number of households from the
county’s total number of households to obtain the number of households for the NFIP
community that bears the county name. For example, for the NFIP community called
“Oktibbeha County”, we subtract Starkville’s (which is an NFIP community distinct from
“Oktibbeha County” NFIP community) total number of household from the total number
of households in “Oktibbeha County” to obtain the number of households for “Oktibbeha
County”. We further scale (divide) by 1000
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In Tables 3.2 we present a summary of the dependent variables (number of
policies-in-force and damage claims payments), the CRS variables (CRS participation,
SFHA, and non-SFHA), geospatial variables, and socioeconomic variables. Tables 3.3
present the summary of community-level specific CRS mitigation activities variables
used in this research.
Table 3.2

Summary of dependent, CRS, geospatial, and socioeconomic variables

Variables

Policies-in-force
Damage Claims
Payments

Unit

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Dependent Variables (N = 5860)
Units (1000s) 337.564
1025.239
US $
632408.7
1.08e+07

0.000
0.000

10150.
3.74e+08

Independent variables
CRS

CRS variable (N = 293)
Binary
0.107
0.288

0.000

1.000

Geospatial variables (N = 293, except for precipitation N = 5860)
Mississippi
Binary
0.512
0.501
0.000
1.000
Coast
Binary
0.171
0.377
0.000
1.000
Slope
Degree
2.645
1.697
0.116
8.212
Stream density
miles
1.472
0.397
0.000
2.593
Elevation
Feet (100s) 345.734
234.188
1.042
1198.619
Precipitation
inches
57.589
10.934
25.603 170.795
SFHA (A & V)
% land area 0.218
0.177
0.000
0.938
Non-SFHA (B &
% land area 0.754
0.214
0.000
0.987
C)
Coverage
Education
Income
Household

Socioeconomic variables (N = 293)
US $
5.31e+07
1.93e+08
% college
16.004
9.210
educated
US $
29.863
10.123
1000 Units 11.560
21.265
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0.000
4.190

2.26e+09
68.820

10.344
0.146

97.020
236.841

Table 3.3

Summary of community-level specific CRS mitigation activities

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Public Information Activities
Elevation Certificate (c310)

65.517

13.388

0

142

Map Information Service (c320)

134.697

24.197

0

140

Outreach Project (c330)

114.521

74.109

0

350

Hazard Disclosure (c340)

13.788

18.995

0

66

Flood Protection Info. (c350)

31.358

18.375

0

102

Flood Protection Ass. (c360)

24.7758

28.969

0

68

Mapping and Regulations
Floodplain Mapping (c410)

5.261

17.237

0

167

Open Space Preservation (c420)

71.600

76.092

0

388

Higher Regulatory Standards (c430)

226.502

197.026

0

885

Flood data Maintenance (c440)

58.523

48.993

0

180

Storm Water Management (c450)

47.229

50.345

0

225

Flood damage reduction activities
Floodplain Management Planning (c510)

70.320

78.489

0

257

Acquisition and relocation (c520)

66.667

171.573

0

812

Flood Protection (c530)

2.682

13.037

0

84

197.369

113.902

0

330

Drainage System Maintenance (c540)

Warning and Response Activities
Flood Warning and response (c610)

40.919

61.587

0

205

Dam Safety (c630)

40.349

31.182

0

68

N = 528
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Data processing
All of the above data were merged into a single dataset by cross-referencing
FEMA community identification codes, community name, state FIPS (Federal
Information Processing Standard) codes, county FIPS codes, American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) codes, FIPS entity codes, and year. The merging process was
done using Microsoft Excel and ArcGIS software, in cooperation with John Cartwright.
NFIP communities with less than 20 policies-in-force in more than 18 periods were
dropped from the dataset. Omission of these observations was necessary because some
NFIP communities had zero or single-digit policies-in-force.
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MATCHING
This chapter introduces and discusses the matching process used in the research.
We look at the general concept of matching, and the main matching methods within the
matching literature. We also discuss how we applied matching to our dataset, and present
a results summary on the outcome of the matching.
In the matching literature, studies that have evaluated the impact of program
interventions have shown the importance of selecting units that received, and those that
did not receive, program intervention in a way such that selection bias is eliminated
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Rubin and Thomas 2000; Stuart and Green 2008). To do
this, the literature suggests using matching to obtain balance (Rubin 1980; Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1983). By balancing, one ensures that the distributions of the covariates (here
the control variables) for the treatment group (i.e., units that received program
intervention) and the control group (i.e., units that did not receive program intervention)
do not differ. It is when balance is achieved that one can compare the treatment group to
the control group to determine the impact of the program. Thus matching is used to
select units (both from the control group and treatment group) that share similar
characteristics (Rubin 1980; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Although one matches on
covariates of units from the treatment group and that of the control group, matching
becomes difficult when there are more than two covariates. To overcome this, three main
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approaches have been identified in the matching literature: matching on metric distance
(Mahalanobis-metric distance) (Rubin 1980), matching on propensity scores (Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1983), and genetic matching (Diamond and Sekhon 2013).
As a scalar quantity, the Mahalanobis metric-distance (MD) measures the
multivariate distance existing between the units of the treatment group and that of the
control group (Rubin and Thomas 2000; Diamond and Sekhon 2013). Assuming there
are X covariates for units i and j of the treatment group and the control group,
respectively, the MD between the covariates is specified as
MD (Xi ,X j ) =

X

i

- X j  Z-1  X i - X j 

(4.1)

where Z is the sample covariance of the covariates (X), . Generally, the Mahalanobis
metric-distance performs better (in terms of balancing) when covariates are ellipsoidally
distributed (Rubin 1980; Diamond and Sekhon 2013). Also, an increase in the number of
covariates matched on could distort the ability of the Mahalanobis metric-distance
matching to find units with similar distribution of covariates (Gu and Rosenbaum 1993;
Rubin and Thomas 2000).
As an alternative, one may match on the propensity scores as suggested by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) if the covariates are distributed non-ellipsoidally. The
propensity score measures the likelihood that a unit will receive the treatment,
conditioned on the covariates. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we define the
propensity score P(X) as

P(X)  Prob  treatment = 1 X 
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(4.2)

To estimate the propensity score in equation 8, a probit or logit function is used.
However, the choice of a probit or logit function does not lead to significant differences
in propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeining 2008). A poorly-specified propensity
score model could worsen the balancing situation and also bias the estimates of the
outcome (Diamond and Sekhon 2013).
A more general form of the Mahalanobis metric distance is the genetic matching,
as proposed by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). What makes the genetic matching unique
is that unlike the other matching methods, it uses a search algorithm in locating a metric
distance that optimizes covariate balance. With the genetic matching, for each covariate,
weights are assigned to the calculated metric distance between the treated units and the
control units. The weights determine the contribution of the units to achieving balance
(Diamond and Sekhon 2013). Following Diamond and Sekhon (2013), the generalized
Mahalanobis distance is defined as
GMD (Xi ,X j ,W) =

 X - X  WZ  Z   X - X 
i

j

-1/2

-1/2

i

j

(4.3)

where Z1/ 2 is the sample covariance of the covariates (Cholesky decomposition of Z ),
and X is still defined as the covariates. The covariates could be replaced with estimated
propensity scores or one can include both the estimated propensity scores and the
covariates. W is the weight matrix which is positive definite with the off-diagonal
elements being zero.
After estimating the Mahalanobis distance  MD  , the propensity scores  P(X)  ,
or the generalized Mahalanobis distance (GMD), a matching algorithm is used to select
the units from the control and treatment groups (Diamond and Sekhon 2013). Various
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matching algorithms have been discussed in the literature (Sianesi 2001; Stuart and
Greene 2008; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Diamond and Sekhon 2013) to include nearestneighbor, radius, caliper, and stratification. The Nearest-neighbor matching may involve
matching with replacement or without replacement. The matching algorithm is
performed such that for every unit of the treated group, m units from the control group
are identified and matched. Although with replacement a greater number of units from
the control group are kept, one cannot rule out biasness in estimates (Stuart and Green
2008; Dehejia and Wahba 2002). The closer the distance or the propensity scores the
better the match. For Radius matching algorithm, a neighborhood (radius) for the treated,
and control group is defined, and all treated and control units that fall in the
neighborhood are seen as matches. The choice of neighborhood can affect the matching
efficiency. For example, a smaller neighborhood can increase matching efficiency.
However, one may lose both treated and control units. The caliper matching algorithm
can be seen as a combination of nearest-neighbor and radius matching algorithm. Thus,
for caliper matching algorithm, a control unit is matched to the treated unit if, for
example, the control unit’s propensity score falls within a given caliper. Within the
caliper, one could use the nearest-neighbor to find matches. Stratification matching
involves grouping, for example the estimated propensity scores, into blocks based on
variations in the scores. The grouping is done such that, within a block, the treated and
control group will have the same average propensity scores. The problem with this
matching method is that it throws away units from both groups if either of them is not
found to belong to a block.
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Studies that have examined causal relationships using panel data have also
employed matching in their studies (Girma, Greenaway, and Richard Kneller 2004; Yasar
and Rejesus 2005; Wagner 2002). In this research we employ the genetic matching. We
use the nearest neighbor matching algorithm to select units from the treatment group and
control group. Specifically, for each treated unit we identify three units (m = 3) from the
control group that are closer in distance. We mention here that we perform matching on
a subset of our dataset. Thus we consider units (NFIP communities both treated and
control) for the year 2013 when performing the GenMatch. This was to ensure that we
maintain a dataset that is balanced (i.e., balanced in terms of each NFIP community
having the same number of periods, 1994-2013) after the matching for further regression
analysis. Although this may have some limitation to our findings, most of the pretreatment covariates we match on are time-invariant. Thus since the values of most
covariates do not change over time for a given NFIP community, matching using data on
one year period (2013) shouldn’t lead to any significant change in results if any. We
choose the year 2013 because in 2013, most NFIP communities had joined the CRS
program.
We use the R (version 3.3.0) statistical package in performing the GenMatch.
First, we categorize our data into CRS participating communities (treatment group) and
non-participating communities (control group). The categorization is based on
community’s participation during the most recent year observed (i.e., 2013). We estimate
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of CRS participation on NFIP policiesin-force rate. Estimating the ATT here was not our primary aim. However, this was used
in the process of obtaining our matched sample. We included estimated propensity
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scores, higher order, and interaction terms of the covariates that were continuous, in the
GenMatch function in R. The GenMatch algorithm then assigns weights to the covariates
such that, the weights depict the importance of the covariates in achieving balance. The
weights generated by GenMatch were then fed into the Match function in R, together
with the covariates. In both the GenMatch and the Matched functions in R, we use the
nearest neighbor with replacement. The Match function yields a final set of weights that
identify our final matched sample (where control units are weighted based on the number
of times each is used as a match, and where all treatment units received a weight of one).
We present the covariates used in the matching process in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1

Covariates used in the GenMatch.

Time-invariant pre-treatment
covariates

Time-varying pre-treatment
covariates

SFHA

Education

non-SFHA

Income

Slope

Households

Stream density
Elevation
Mississippi
Coast

We exclude the precipitation variable from the set of pre-treatment covariates
when performing the genetic matching because it reduces balance. As recommended by
Ho et al. (2007), although by theory one has to account for all variables that otherwise
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would have been used in a regression, not all pre-treatment covariates are to be used
especially when including them in the matching process leads to inefficiency (balance).
Summary of Matching Results
In Table 4.2, we show the means of the covariates before and after the matching.
It is clearly seen from Table 4.2 that, unlike the means of the covariates for the control
group that varies before and after the matching, that of the treatment group stay constant
before and after the matching. Thus all the units from the treatment group found matches
from the control group but not the vice versa.
Table 4.2

Means of covariates before and after matching

Variables

mean of treatment

mean of control

Before match

After match

Before match

After match

Coast

0.488

0.488

0.116

0.447

Mississippi

0.721

0.721

0.474

0.587

SFHA

0.297

0.297

0.204

0.277

Non-SFHA

0.661

0.661

0.770

0.706

Slope

1.978

1.978

2.763

2.112

Stream density

1.279

1.279

1.506

1.456

218.780

218.780

367.730

224.060

Income

44646

44646

38129

44087

Education

0.179

0.179

1.228

0.168

Household

14265

14265

69726

15961

Elevation
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In Figure 4.1, we also show the distribution of the covariates before and after
matching. We expect that after matching, the distribution of pre-treatment covariates will
be similar for CRS participating communities, and non-participating communities. To
examine the appropriateness of our matching, we follow Ho et al. (2007) to construct
quantile-quantile plots (QQ-plot) of the pre-treatment covariates used in the genetic
matching. For binary variables coastal and Mississippi, we exhibit the distributions using
the histogram. Shown are the distributions of covariates before and after matching. In
the QQ plots, points more proximal to the 45o line depict good matches, whereas points
more distant to the 45o line indicate poor matches between the treatment units and the
control units. With the histogram, for a good match, the bars for the treated and the
control units should be at par or close to that relative to before matching. A visual
examination of the QQ plots shows that, pre-treatment covariates such as elevation,
slope, SFHA, income, and education for CRS participating (treatment group) and nonparticipating communities have similar distribution after the genetic matching was done
relative to before the matching. On the other hand, the distribution of pre-treatment
covariates such as stream density and non-SFHA for CRS participating and nonparticipating communities were not the best both prior to matching and after matching.
The histogram shows good distribution for coast and Mississippi after matching.
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Elevation before
matching

Elevation after
matching

Slope before
matching

Slope after matching

Stream density
before matching

Stream density
after matching

SFHA before
matching

SFHA after matching

non-SFHA before
matching

non-SFHA After
matching

Households before
Matching

Households after
matching

Figure 4.1

QQ plots showing the distribution of pre-treatment covariates before and
after matching
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Income before
matching

Income after
matching

Education before
matching

Coast before and after matching

Education after
matching

Mississippi before after matching

Figure 4.1 (continued)
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we discuss the conceptual framework for the research. Our
analysis is conducted at the community level, and thus we rely heavily on previous
research also conducted at the community, county, or other aggregate level. However,
our analysis can nevertheless be informed by previous research conducted at the
individual level, under the assumption that behavioral relationships at play at the
individual level are reflected in the relationships at the community level. In fact, our
community-level data are merely the product of thousands of insurance purchase
decisions made at the individual level. At the community level, the explanatory variables
will be aggregate measures, and these aggregate measures may serve as reasonable
proxies for the effects, on average, at the individual level. For example, if a higherincome household is hypothesized to be more likely to purchase insurance, ceteris
paribus, then a community with higher median income is hypothesized to be more likely
to have a higher rate of insurance at the community level. We present a summary of the
literature on factors affecting the choice to purchase flood (and closely related) insurance,
and develop some testable hypotheses based on past findings.
Demand for Insurance
In the insurance literature, different theories (expected utility, prospect theory,
subjective expected utility, and random utility theory) have been used to explain peoples’
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demand for insurance and/or, coverage level (Smith 1968; Smith and Baquet 1996; Coble
et al. 1996; Marquis and Long 1995; Kriesel and Landry 2004; Schmidt and Zank 2007;
Landry and Jahan-Parvar 2011; Petrolia, Landry, and Coble 2013; Petrolia et al. 2015).
These theories assume that a rational individual makes decisions based on utility
maximization. On a general note, individuals’ utility for insurance and coverage demand
has been defined over factors such as wealth, insurance prices, education, risk
preferences, and subjective risk perception (Smith and Baquet 1996; Coble et al 1996;
Marquis and Long 1995; Browne and Hoyt 2000; Landry and Jahan-Parvar 2011; Kousky
2011; Petrolia, Landry, and Coble 2013; Petrolia et al 2015). Smith and Baquet (1996)
observed in their study that farm operators’ level of education is positively related to their
decision to demand for multiple peril crop insurance. Coble et al. (1996) finds a negative
relationship between crop producers’ wealth and the likelihood that they will purchase
crop insurance. Smith and Baquet (1996) mention that wealthier farm operators are more
likely to self-insure than buy insurance. Marquis and Long (1995) finds income to be
positively related to demand for health insurance by non-employment based workers.
Petrolia et al. (2015) also finds a positive relationship between the log of income and
wind insurance purchase. They also find that relative to non-coastal residents, a positive
relationship exists between residents from the coastal zone and wind insurance purchase.
In that same study, they find a positive relationship between homeowners’ risk aversion
and wind insurance purchase. Specific to flood insurance demand, Browne and Hoyt
(2000), and Kriesel and Landry (2004), analyzed factors affecting demand for flood
insurance and finds a negative relationship between insurance price and flood insurance
demand. Other factors such as income have also been found to be positively related to
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flood insurance demand (Browne and Hoyt 2000; Kriesel and Landry 2004; Kousky
2011; Petrolia, Landry, and Coble 2013). Kriesel and Landry (2004) also find that
artificial flood mitigation (seawalls) has a positive effect on NFIP participation. On the
other hand, Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) find a negative relationship between flood
mitigation (CRS score) and insurance demand. Browne and Hoyt (2000) also find a
negative effect of federal spending on flood mitigation on flood insurance demand. The
study by Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) finds a positive relationship between
individuals located in SFHA and insurance demand. Dixon, Macdonald, and
Zissimopoulos (2007) who looked at commercial wind insurance in the Gulf States have
mentioned that rising demand for insurance for properties in the Gulf and Atlantic Coast
can be explained by the increasing population growth and property values.
In this research we follow Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) in assuming that
homeowners’ decision to purchase a flood insurance policy can be conceptualized on the
bases of subjective expectation of utility. We first assume that the individual homeowner
in community i aims at maximizing subjective expectation of utility for flood insurance
such that the decision to take-up or no-take-up of flood insurance policy can be stated as

EUritake-up/no-take-up = (P(C, F, H, B), γ(G),S)

(5.1)

Where P is the insurance premium, C is the CRS credit points in community i , F is
the various flood zones in community i , H represents hydrological factors such as
rainfall, and B is building characteristics. Gamma (γ) represents the property owner’s
subjective perception of flood risk. G is the geospatial setting of community i , and S is
the socioeconomic characteristics of the individual in community i . We assume that
insurance premium (P) is itself a function of CRS class (C) (the CRS class depends on
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the overall CRS points), flood zone (F) , building characteristics (B) , and hydrological
factors such as rainfall (H) . Homeowners’ subjective perception of flood risk (γ) is
assumed to be a function of factors including but not limited to geospatial factors (G) .
Homeowner (r) will choose to take-up flood insurance policy if the subjective expectation
of utility of taking-up flood insurance policy is greater than the subjective expectation of
utility of not taking-up flood insurance policy. That is, EUri (•)take-up > EUri (•)no-take-up .
However, our data is aggregated at the community-level. Thus, we assume that if
individual homeowner’s subjective expectation of utility for flood insurance policy is
greater than not taking-up flood insurance policy, then each take-up of flood insurance
policy adds to the number of flood insurance policies (NFIP policies-in-force) in
community i and vice versa. That is individual homeowners’ flood insurance policy takeup is seen as a share of the aggregate number of NFIP policies-in-force in community i .
We therefore assume that the aggregate number of NFIP policies-in-force (Q) in
community i at time t is defined as
n

Qit =  q rit .

(5.2)

i=1

Where, q rit is 1 if individual homeowner r takes-up NFIP policy and 0 if no-take-up of
NFIP policy in community i at time t.
In our conceptual framework, we assume that as a proxy for homeowners’
perception of flood risk, homeowners residing in coastal communities, low-lying areas or
floodplains, communities with higher percentage of land area covered by water, and
communities with high annual rainfall will have a higher perception of flood risk relative
to residents in; non-coastal communities, communities with higher elevation, and
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communities that observe less annual rainfall, all else equal. As a matter of fact, these
variables may serve as an objective measure of flood risk which makes them good
proxies for individuals’ subjective measures of flood risk. Hence these variables could
influence homeowner’ flood insurance purchase.
Damage claims payments
Differences in individual’s wealth could also affect decision to file for damage
claims. Thus since people’s marginal utility decrease as their wealth increases, it is
logical to expect wealthier policy holders to have lower motivation of filing for damage
claims (Cummins and Tennyson 1996). However, one could also expect that when a
damage event occurs, claims payments made to wealthy individuals will be higher,
relative to low income earners given that wealthier people have larger coverage. With
regards to floods, factors such as heavy rains, and other storm surge events resulting from
hurricanes are seen as determinants of claims payments (Spekkers et al., 2013). MichelKerjan, and Kousky (2010) notes that the average claim payments varied for V flood
zones, and A flood zones in Florida, with the V flood zones having a greater amount of
claims payments. That is, it is assumed that the flood zone area of the household affects
damage claims payments. In regards to this, since V flood zones are related to the coastal
areas and A flood zones are related to the non-coastal areas (although both zones are
classified as high flood risk zones (SFHA)), it can be hypothesized that damage claims
payments are of different magnitudes among coastal and non-coastal areas. Highfield
and Brody (2013) also find a positive relationship between precipitation and damage
claims payment. Highfield and Brody (2013) also find population to be positively related
to damage claims payments.
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Similar to policies-in-force which we observe at the community-level, damage
claims payments made to individual household is assumed to adds-up to the aggregate at
the community-level. That is, we assume that for every addition to the number of policy
holders filing for damage claim, total claims payments increases. Hence we state that d rit ,
the damage claims payment made to individual household  r  in community  i  at time

 t  , is aggregated across individual claimers within the community at time

t as

n

Dit =  d rit

(5.3)

r=1

where r = 1, 2,…, n, and t = 1, 2,…, T .
Based on findings from past studies (Smith 1968; Smith and Baquet 1996; Coble
et al. 1996; Marquis and Long 1995; Kriesel and Landry 2004; Schmidt and Zank 2007;
Landry and Jahan-Parvar 2011; Petrolia, Landry, and Coble 2013; Petrolia et al. 2015),
on factors that affects demand for insurance and also factors that affects damage claims
payments (Cummins and Tennyson 1996; Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010; Highfield
and Broody 2013), we assume that at the aggregate level, NFIP policies-in-force and
damage claims payments  yi  , are a function  f  of flood mitigation (CRS), geospatial
factors of the community, and socioeconomic factors. That is,

 CRS,Coast, Mississippi, Precipitation, Elevation,Slope,Stream density, 
yi = f 

 SFHA, Non -SFHA,Coverage, Education, Income, and Household

Hypotheses
Based on our conceptual framework, and what past studies have found, we
hypothesize the following relationships in Table 5.1
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(5.4)

Table 5.1

Hypothesized relationships between dependent and independent variables

Variable

Definition of variables

CRS

1= CRS Community,
0 = otherwise
1= located in NOAAdesignated coastal county
0 = otherwise
1= Mississippi community, 0
otherwise
Annual amount of rainfall in
inches
Highest point of a community
in
Maximum rate of change from
a grid cell to its neighbor
Length of stream divided by
square miles of an area within
the community
Percent of land area in flood
zones A + V
Percent of land area in flood
zones B + C
% College educated
Median household income ($)
Number of households

Coast
Mississippi
Precipitation
Elevation
Slope
Stream density
SFHA
Non-SFHA
Education
Income
Households
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Hypothesized
signs on NFIP
participation
+

hypothesized
signs on
Damage
Claims
-

+

+

?

?

+

+

-

-

?

?

+

+

+

+

-

-

+
+
?

?
?
?

ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND ESTIMATION
In this chapter of the research, we discuss the econometric model as well as
method of estimation. The chapter begins by introducing the various models for panel
data and estimation. The chapter ends with the empirical model and estimation approach
for the research and model selection process.
Modelling Panel Data
To begin with, a simple econometric model would be such that
yi = α + xiβ + εi

(6.1)

where yi is the dependent variable, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, x i is a
vector of independent variables, and ε i is the error term. However, given that our data
are a panel, we need to account for the time series aspect. Thus the model above only
accounts for cross-section. Panel data are data with repeated observations (responses) on
an individual unit. That is, it has a cross sectional-dimension (N) and a time series
dimension (T) (Wooldridge 2002). Some advantages of using panel data are that it gives
room to account for individual heterogeneity, and also good for studying dynamic
relationships (Greene 2012; Wooldridge 2002). There are some challenges in using panel
data. Panel data have issues of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and endogeneity
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(Greene 2012; Wooldridge 2002). To account for both the cross-section and time series
dimension, we may rewrite equation 6.1 as,

yit = xit β + zi α + ε it

(6.2)

where, y it is the dependent variable we seek to explain, x it is a vector of covariates, β is
a vector of parameters, z i is a vector of observed or unobserved factors (heterogeneity or
individual effects) α is the associated vector of parameters, and ε it is the error term. The
subscripts i and t are the units (in our case, the communities) and time (year)
respectively. Should z i be unobserved, then

yit = xit β + ci + ε it

(6.3)

where ci is the unobserved heterogeneity . The vector of covariates may include
variables that remain constant over time but vary across individual units, variables that
are constant over time and across individual units, variables that change over time and
across individual units and those that vary over time but constant across individual units.
Panel data may be modeled as pooled (also known as population average model),
fixed-effects, or random-effects model. The fixed-effects and random-effects models are
usually referred to as unobserved effects models (Wooldridge 2002; Greene 2012;
Baltagi 2008). Mundlak (1978) proposes an approach for modeling panel data when
unobserved heterogeneity is assumed. This approach is seen as a settlement of the
differences between the fixed-effects and the random-effects model (Greene 2012). The
distinction between pooled, fixed-effects, random-effects, and Mundlak’s (1978) model is
made based on the assumption that underlies the conditional mean, E ci x i  , of the
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unobserved heterogeneity  ci  in equation 6.3. We discuss these models (pooled, fixedeffects, random-effect, and Mundlak’s approach) next.
Pooled model
The pooled model (population averaged model), assumes that
E ci x i  = h  x i  = α , where α is a constant. That is, there are no unobserved individual-

specific effects  ci  in the pooled model. It is referred to as the population averaged
model because it assumes there is no heterogeneity in the model, and that all units have
the same constant (intercept). From equation 6.3, a pooled model can be specified as

yit = xit β + α + ε it

(6.4)

The pooled model further assumes that E εit xi1 , xi2 ,…xiTi  = 0 (strict


exogeneity), Var εit xi1 , x i2 ,…x iTi  = σε2 (homoscedasticity),



Cov εit εis x i1 , x i2 ,…x iTi  = 0 if i  j , and t  s (no serial correlation). Here both timevarying, time-invariant variables, and time-period dummies can be estimated.
Fixed-effects model
Unlike the random-effects model, the fixed-effects model allows the individual
heterogeneity to be correlated with the observed independent variables (Greene 2012).
For the fixed-effects model, it is assumed that E ci x i  = h(x i ) = αi . The fixed-effects
model can be specified as

yit = xit β + αi + ε it
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(6.5)

where α i represents a constant term for a particular unit. Thus fixed-effects models
assume that E μi x it   0 , hence Cov μ i , x   0 . The unobserved heterogeneity is
assumed to be absorbed into the error term ε it . It is important to mention that for the
fixed-effects model, time-invariant covariates cannot be estimated because they are
confounded with the unit-specific constants (Wooldridge 2002; Greene 2012). Only timevarying variables and time-period dummies are allowed. A fixed-effect model maybe a
one-way or a two-way fixed-effect. A one-way fixed-effects model have different
constant for the individual units, and the two-way fixed effects model contains a constant
for each of the individual units as well as a constant for each of the individual time
period.
Random-effects model
The random-effects model, assumes the presence of unobserved individualspecific effects (individual heterogeneity) are not correlated with the independent
variables. Thus, for random-effects model, E ci x i  = 0 . From equation 6.3 the randomeffect model is

yit = xit β + (α + μ i ) + ε it

(6.6)

where α is the average of the unobserved-individual heterogeneity, and μ i , which is
allowed to vary cross individual units, is the random unobserved-individual
heterogeneity. The random-effects model further assumes that, E μi xt  = E εit xit  = 0
(strict exogeneity), E εit2 xit  = σε2 , E μ i2 xit  = σμ2 , E εit μ i xit  = 0 for all i, t, and j, and
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E εit ε js X = 0 if t  s or i  j . For random-effects model, time-variant variables, time-

invariant variables, and time-period dummies can be estimated (Wooldridge 2002;
Greene 2012).
Mundlak (1978) approach
The assumption Mundlak (1978) approach makes about the conditional mean of
the unobserved heterogeneity is that, E[ci | Xi ] = h( Xi ) = xiγ . From equation 6.3, the
model for Mundlak’s approach of dealing with the heterogeneity is specified as,

yit = xit β + xiγ + μ i + ε it

(6.7)

Unlike the fixed-effects model and the random-effects model, the Mundlak (1978)
approach attempts to account for heterogeneity via group-mean variables. I.e., he adds to
the model variables whose observed values are the means over time for each individual of
the time-varying variables already included in the model. For example, if an income
variable is included in the model that varies over time, then an additional group-mean
income variable would also be included that repeats the mean of a given individual’s
income over all of that individual’s observations. The Mundlak approach is similar to the
random-effects model just that here, the correlation between the observed covariates and
the unobserved heterogeneity are addressed by adding the group-means of the timevarying covariates (Greene 2012). As noted by Greene (2012), the Mundlak approach
can be used as a compromise between the fixed and random-effects models. This model
can include both time-varying and time-invariant variables, as well as time-period
dummies.
50

Empirical Models and Estimation
We construct our empirical models based on the objectives of the research. To
begin with, we first let
 log of NFIP policies - in - force
y =
it log of damage claims payments

(6.8)

Based on our conceptual framework, we specify our base econometric model for
estimating the effect of CRS participation on the log of NFIP policies-in-force and on the
log of damage claims payment as
yit = α + xit β + ε it

(6.9)

where, α is the intercept, x it is a vector of time-varying and time-invariant independent
variables: CRS, income, education, number of households, precipitation year,
Mississippi, coast, slope, stream density, elevation, special flood hazard area (SFHA),
and non-special flood hazard area (non-SFHA). Other independent variables we include
when considering the log of NFIP policies-in-force are; time trend and a dummy for PostKatrina. For log of damage claims payments, we add to the independent variables, year
dummies and log of coverage amount. β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The
subscripts i and t are the communities and the response year respectively. ε is the error
term in the model.
In a different analysis where we estimate the effect of community-level specific
CRS mitigation activities on outcome, we replace the CRS variable (a binary variable)
with the specific CRS mitigation activities (continuous variables).
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Testing for model assumptions
To effectively estimate and test for the relationship that exist between the
dependent variable and the independent variables, the assumptions that underlie the
various panel data models must be considered. When issues of serial autocorrelation,
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation the estimates become inefficient and
also standard errors are biased. That is, we test for possible serial correlation,
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation. We use Wooldridge’s test for serial
correlation (Wooldridge 2002) and the Pesaran (2004) test for contemporaneous
correlation. To test for the presence of heteroskedasticity, we use White’s general test for
heteroskedasticity. The Hausman test is used to test the fixed-effects model assumption
against the random-effects model assumption. However, the fixed-effects model is
limited in that effects of time-invariant variables that may be of interest to the researcher
cannot be estimated.
Serial autocorrelation occurs when the errors are correlated across-tome within a
unit. The Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation uses the residuals obtained from
estimating the regression by first-differencing. The residuals are then regressed on the
lag of the residuals and a test that the parameter of the lagged residuals is equal to -0.5 is
carried out. Where there is no serial correlation, the Corr  Δεit , Δεit-1  = -0.5 . The test is
ultimately performed under the null hypothesis that, there is no serial correlation
(Wooldridge 2002; Drukker 2003).
The Pesaran (2004) test for contemporaneous correlation or cross-section
dependence is used when one has a large number of units (N) and a relatively small
number of time periods (T). Cross-sectional dependence may occur due to common
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shocks and other unobserved factors that are assumed to be part of the error term. This
test is based on a pair-wise correlation coefficient. The null hypothesis to be tested here
is that, Corr εit , ε jt  = 0 . In other words, ε it and ε jt are independently distributed and
serially uncorrelated (Pesaran 2004; Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006).
White’ test for heteroskedasticity performs better in situations where the errors
are not normally distributed. The White test does not require the specification of the
structure of the heteroskedasticity (White 1980; Greene 2012). The null hypothesis to be
tested here is that the errors are homoscedastic (constant variance of the errors) the test is
based on a chi-squared distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom (Greene 2012). The
letter k is the number of parameters.
To test if there are no individual-effects and that the pooled model (base model) is
preferred to the random-effects or fixed-effects model, the Breusch-Pagan (B-P)
Lagrange multiplier test is used to test the null hypothesis that there are no individualeffects. The computation of the test statistic is based on the residuals from the pooled
model. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test uses the chi-square test statistic with
1 degree of freedom. Where the value of the test statistic is large, the individual-effects
model is preferred to the base model (pooled) (Greene 2012). An alternative to the
Breusch-Pagan test is the Baltalgi-Li test which is also based on a chi-squared test
statistic. Where the data is balanced, the two approaches are the same (Greene 2012)
The Hausman (1978) specification test for fixed and random-effects model test
the null hypothesis that the unobserved heterogeneity are correlated with the observed
independent variables (Greene 2012). In other words, the null hypothesis is that the
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preferred model is random-effects. The Hausman test uses the chi-square test statistic
distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom (Greene 2012).
For the Mundlak (1978) approach, we follow Wu’s (1973) variable addition test
to test the null hypothesis that the parameters of the means of the time-varying variables
included in the model are not different from zero. The test statistic is based on a chisquare distribution. Wu’s test is also seen as an alternative to the Hauseman test for
random-effects vs. fixed-effects (Greene 2012).
We test for the presence of serial autocorrelation, contemporaneous correlation,
and heteroskedasticity using Stata (v.14.1). Specifically, in Stata, to test for serial
correlation using the Wooldridge (2002) approach, we use the xtserial command
(Drukker 2003). To test for contemporaneous correlation, we use the xtcsd command in
Stata (Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006). White’s general test for heteoskedasticity is performed
using the estat imtest, white command in Stata.
The Breusch-Pagan (B-P) Lagrange multiplier test is obtained after running the
pooled model in NLOGIT. Similarly, the Wu’s test statistic is reported after running the
Mundlak’s random-effects model by including means of time-varying variables in the
random-effects model in NLOGIT.
Results on Model assumption test
Presented in Table 6.1 are the results on the tests for serial correlation,
contemporaneous correlation, heteroskedasticity, test for pooled vs random or fixedeffects, test for random vs. fixed-effects, and the Wu’s test for the inclusion of means of
time-varying independent variables. From the results, we find the presence of serial
correlation, contemporaneous correlation, and heteroskedasticity, when considering the
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unmatched and matched data for estimating CRS participation effects on NFIP policiesin-force. The results also show evidence of contemporaneous correlation and
heteroskedasticity when we consider the unmatched data for estimating effects of CRS
participation on damage claims payments. For matched data we find only
heteoskedasticity. For data including claims greater than zero only, we find evidence of
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. We also find serial correlation and
heteroskedasticiy for the specific CRS mitigation activities effects on NFIP policies-inforce. We do not find serial and heteroskedasticity for specific CRS mitigation activities
effects on damage claims payments.
Results on the tests for assumptions on the individual effects (pooled vs random
or fixed-effects, random vs. fixed-effects, and test for the inclusion of the means for timevarying independent variables) also show that, for both unmatched and matched data for
the effects of CRS participation on NFIP policies-in-force, the random-effects or the
fixed-effects is preferred to the pooled model. The Hausman test for random-effects vs.
fixed-effects shows that the fixed-effects model is preferred to the random-effects model.
Results on Wu’s test also favors the fixed-effects model since we reject the null
hypothesis that the parameters of the group means are equal to zero. That is, the test
shows that the Mundlak’s random-effects model does not mimic a standard randomeffects model, but rather a fixed-effect model.
With regards to the effect of CRS participation on damage claims payments
(unmatched data), we observe from the results in Table 6.1 that, the individual effects
model (random or fixed-effects) is preferred to the pooled model. The Hausman test
result indicates that the fixed-effects specification is the preferred model, and Wu test
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also the group-mean effects are significant. This finding indicates that the Mundlak
approach can be used to mimic the fixed-effects model while also allowing for the
estimation of time-invariant geospatial variable effects. Considering the effect of CRS
participation on damage claims payments (matched data), the test results show that the
fixed-effects or random-effects is preferred to the pooled model. The Hausman test for
fixed-effects vs. random-effects indicates that the random-effects model is preferred to
the fixed-effects model, and the Wu test also fails to reject the null hypothesis that the
parameter estimates for the group means are equal to zero, hence the standard randomeffects model is the preferred model. For data on damage claims payments greater than
zero, the test results show that the fixed-effects or random-effects are preferred to the
pooled model. Hausman test favors the fixed-effects model but the Wu test also rejects
the null hypothesis that the parameters of the group means are zero. That is, the fixedeffects and the Mundlak’s approach are preferred.
Considering specific CRS activities effects on NFIP policies-in-force
(unmatched), results show that the fixed-effects and random-effects is preferred to the
pooled model but Hausman test favors the fixed-effects to the random-effects. The Wu
test also shows that the Mundlak’s group-mean effects are significant. With regards to
specific CRS activities effects on damage claims payments, test results from Table 6.1
shows that there are no individual effects in the model. Thus, the pooled model is
preferred to the fixed-effects or the random-effects
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F(1, 292) =
1.48
F(1, 91) =
0.001
F(1,178)
=117.64***

F(1, 43) =
31.30***

F(1, 43) =
3.73*

Unmatched
(N = 5,860)
Matched
(N = 1,840)
Claims > 0
(N = 1,807)

Unmatched
(N = 528)

Unmatched
(N = 528)

White Test for
Heteroskedasticy

N/A
χ2(291) =
χ2 = 1246.28***
(data unbalanced)
495.44***
Specific CRS activities effects on claims payments
N/A
χ2(527) =
χ2 = 1.37
(data unbalanced)
528.00

Specific CRS activities effects on policies-in-force

Breusch-Pagan
Test for Pooled
vs.fixed/randomeffects
CRS participation effects on policies-in-force
Corr. coeff. =
χ2(151) =
χ2 = 35929.54***
109.11***
1373.19 ***
Corr. coeff. =
χ2(151) =
χ2 = 1791.14***
30.02***
905.89***
CRS participation effects on claims payments
Corr. coeff. =
χ2(367) =
χ2 = 672.85***
4.07***
1252.69 ***
Corr. coeff. =
χ2(367) =
χ2 = 30.67***
-2.44
616.40***
N/A
χ2(367) =
χ2 = 64. 08***
(data unbalanced)
641.28***

Pesaran Test for
Contemporaneous
Correlation.

Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance

F(1, 292) =
609.65 ***
F(1, 91) =
233.90***

Wooldridge Test
for Serial
Correlation.

Results on model assumption tests

Unmatched
(N = 5,860)
Matched
(N = 1,840)

Data

Table 6.1

χ2 = 23.02***

χ2(25) = 50.62***

χ2(23) = 28.27

χ2 =18.29

χ2 = 1011.31***

χ2 = 12.71*

χ2(11) = 3.79

χ2(23) = 64.50***

χ2 = 26.85***

χ2 = 38.41***

χ2(7) = 55.89***
χ2(15) = 26.96**

χ2 = 46.79 ***

Wu Test for
group means

χ2 (7) = 127.03***

Hausman Test for
Fixed-effects vs.
Random-effects

Panel Model Estimation in the presence of Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation
Where serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity exists, the robust variance
matrix estimator can be used (Wooldridge 2002). The estimator is said to be valid in
cases where one has issues of heteroskedasticity or serial correlation (Wooldridge 2002).
The rule in using the robust variance matrix estimator is that the time or year period  T 
must be fixed or small relative to the number of units  N  . The robust variance matrix
estimator is specified for a pooled OLS model as
-1
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(6.10)

where AVarˆ is the estimated asymptotic variance, ̂ is the parameter estimates, and ε̂ are
the residuals.
For the fixed-effects model it is specified as
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(6.11)

where Xi indicates only independent variables that vary over time. The difference
between the two equations is that, for fixed-effect estimator only the time demeaned
errors ε it can be estimated and not ε it (Wooldridge 2002). For random-effects model the
robust variance matrix estimator can be specified as
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(6.12)

ˆ = σˆ 2 Ι + σˆ 2 j j which equal the variance covariance matric. σ̂ 2 is the estimated
where Ω
μ T
c T T

variance which is constant, Ι is an identity matrix is, and jT jT is a T xT matrix with
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elements that are unity. v̂ are estimated residuals from the random-effect estimator.
Using the robust variance matrix estimator may lead to larger standard errors
(Wooldridge 2002)
Estimating the empirical models
Based on the results obtained after testing for model assumptions (pooled vs.
random or fixed-effects, random vs. fixed-effects, and Mundlak’s random-effects) we
settle on estimating the empirical models using the estimation approaches as summarized
in Table 6.2. As mentioned earlier, the Mundlak’s random-effects approach is a
compromise between the random-effects and the fixed-effects model (Greene 2012).
Although it retains the specification of the random-effects model, the assumption

 E[c

i

Xi ] = 0  made under the random-effects does not apply to the Mundlak’s random-

effects approach. Thus, results from the Mundlak’s approach are closer to the fixed
effects approach. However, unlike the fixed-effects, the Mundlak’s approach allows for
the estimation of time-invariant variables. For example, if we consider the unmatched
data, for CRS participation effect on NFIP policies-in-force, the parameter estimate for
CRS based on random-effects model and fixed-effects-model are 0.792 and 0.660
respectively. On the other hand, the estimate from the Mundlak’s random-effects
approach is 0.642. That is, we observe that the difference in the magnitude of the
estimates for the random-effects model to the fixed-effects model is clearly distinctive.
On the other hand, the estimate from the Mundlak’s random-effect approach is very close
to that of the fixed-effects. Again, consider the matched data (for NFIP policies-inforce), the parameter estimate for CRS for the random-effects, fixed-effects, and
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Mundlak’s random-effects models, respectively, are 1.147, 1.018, and 1.058. That is, the
parameter estimate for Mundlak’s-random-effects is similar to the fixed-effects
We estimate the parameters for the models (pooled, Mundlak’s random-effects,
and fixed-effects) using the NLOGIT (version 5) routine for estimating linear regression
models for panel data as described in Greene (2012). We apply the robust command to
account for the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity where necessary. We estimated the
Mundlak’s random-effects approach by including means of time-varying variables in the
model and use the random-effects option in NLOGIT. Where matched data are used, a
weighting variable is specified. In all we estimate 12 models.
Summary of empirical models and estimation approach
In Table 6.2, we present a summary of the various empirical models estimated in this
research as well as the estimation approaches used.
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Table 6.2

Summary of empirical models and estimation approach

Empirical model

Estimation approach

Effects of CRS participation on NFIP
policies-in-force (unmatched data)

Mundlak’s random-effects and
Fixed-effects

Effects of CRS participation on NFIP
policies-in-force (matched data)

Mundlak’s random-effects and
Fixed-effects

Effects of CRS participation on damage
claims payments (unmatched data)

Mundlak’s random-effects and
Fixed-effects

Effects of CRS participation on damage
claims payments (matched data)

Random-effects

Effects of CRS participation on damage
claims payments (claims>0, unmatched)

Mundlak’s random-effects and
Fixed-effects

Effects of community-level specific CRS
mitigation effects on NFIP policies-in-force
(unmatched data)

Mundlak’s random-effects and
Fixed-effects

Effects of community-level specific CRS
mitigation effects on damage claims
payments (unmatched data)

Pooled

61

RESULTS PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION
Presented in this chapter of the research are the results from the estimated models
as well as discussion of the results. Given that our dependent variable is log transformed;
this presents us with a log-linear model (Gujarati and Porter 2009). The coefficients of
the independent variables of a log-linear model can be interpreted as the relative change
in the dependent variable given an absolute change in the independent variable. When
the coefficients of the independent variables are multiplied by 100, this gives us a percent
change in the dependent variable given a change in the independent variable. That is, this
provides a partial elasticity (Gujarati and Porter 2009). Where the dependent and
independent variable are both in a log transformation, the parameter estimate of the
independent variable can be interpreted as elasticity. That is a percentage change in the
dependent variable given a percentage change in the independent variable (Gujarati and
Porter 2009). However, where the independent variable is a binary variable (in our case
an example is the variable CRS) the interpretation is different. That is, for binary
independent variables, the coefficient gives a multiplicative shift of the regression
equation. Thus, a percent change in E  y x, d  = 100% exp(β) -1 given a change in the
binary variable (Greene 2012).
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Effects of CRS participation on NFIP Participation (log of Policies-in-force)
Under this sub-heading, we present results for the effect of CRS participation on
NFIP participation, using both unmatched and matched data. First, we look at results for
the unmatched data.
Unmatched data
Table 7.1 reports the results of the Mundlak random-effects and fixed-effects
models. The results show a positive and a significant relationship between CRS
participation and NFIP policies-in-force for both the Mundlak’s random-effects and the
fixed-effects estimation approach. That is we see that a discrete change in CRS
participation increases the number of NFIP policies-in-force by 90.0 percent (i.e.,
100%[e0.642 - 1]) and 93.5 percent (i.e., 100%[e 0.660 -1]) respectively, ceteris paribus.
This finding is similar (not in magnitude but in direction) to that of Zahran et al. (2009),
who found a positive and significant relationship between overall CRS points and natural
log of number of policy holders in Florida. Also, the results show that overall, there is an
increase in the number of NFIP policies-in-force overtime. However, the interaction of
the CRS variable and the time trend variable (CRS x Time trend) shows that the growth
over time is slower for CRS communities. Results based on the fixed-effects estimation
approach show that overall, the number of policies-in-force increases after hurricane
Katrina although the growth in the number NFIP policies-in-force is greater for CRS
communities, as indicated by the variable CRS x Post-Katrina ceteris paribus.
Shifting to the socioeconomic variables, results show a positive and significant
effect between income and the number of NFIP policies-in-force. Thus, ceteris paribus a
$1000 increase in income increases the number of NFIP policies-in-force by 1.60 percent
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(i.e., 100% x 0.016) in both estimation approaches. This relationship is in line with our
hypothesized expectation. Past studies (Marquis and Long1995; Brown and Hoyt 2000;
Petrolia et al. 2015) have also found income to be positively related to insurance demand.
Although education had the expected sign (positive) as also found by Smith and Baquet
(1996), our estimate is not significant.
For geospatial variables, the results show a negative relationship between
Precipitation and the number of NFIP policies-in-force for both estimation approaches.
This finding is not as expected given that we hypothesized a positive relationship.
However, this could be explained as, for precipitation to cause damages one expects
extreme amounts. Because the other geospatial variables are time-invariant, they appear
in the Mundlak random-effects model only. The variables Coast and SFHA are positive
and significant in influencing NFIP policies-in-force. Specifically, relative to non-coastal
communities, number of policies-in-force in coastal communities’ increase by 115.3
percent as expected. But the growth in the number of NFIP policies-in-force is slower for
coastal communities during hurricane Katrina although not significant. The results also
show that a one percent increase in land area in SFHA increases the number of NFIP
policies-in-force by 2.1 percent, ceteris paribus. The relationship between SFHA and
NFIP participation (number of policies-in-force) is as expected given that this area has
high flood risk. Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) also find demand for flood insurance
to increase in SFHA. Although, elevation and non-SFHA are negatively related to the
number of NFIP policies-in-force, as hypothesized, they are not significant. Stream
density show up as negatively related to the number of NFIP policies-in-force but this is
not what we expected. Slope also comes out as negative in explaining the number of
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NFIP policies-in-force. The reason for this relationship could be that, homeowners’
properties are located along slopes where the risk of flood is minimal.
Table 7.1

NFIP policies-in-force (unmatched data)
Mundlak’s Random-effects

Variable

Coefficient

Fixed-effects

Robust
Coefficient
Robust
std. errors
std.errors
Time-Varying Variables
CRS
0.642**
0.256
0.660***
0.173
CRS×Time trend
-0.037***
0.012
-0.037***
0.009
CRS×Post-Katrina
0.178
0.122
0.209**
0.090
Time-Trend
0.043***
0.006
0.042***
0.006
Post-Katrina
0.106**
0.050
0.117**
0.047
Education
0.009
0.006
0.009
0.006
Household
0.006
0.005
0.006
0.006
Income
0.016***
0.004
0.016***
0.003
Precipitation
-0.002**
0.001
-0.001**
0.001
Time-Invariant Geospatial Variables
Coast
0.767**
0.307
Coast×Post-Katrina
0.106
0.111
Mississippi
0.194
0.174
Slope
-0.044
0.058
Elevation
-0.001
0.001
Stream Density
-0.314
0.196
SFHA
2.136***
0.486
Non-SFHA
-0.210
0.350
Constant
3.329**
1.651
Mundlak Group Means
CRS
1.339***
0.307
Education
0.012
0.011
Household
0.021**
0.008
Income
0.001
0.010
Precipitation
-0.014
0.030
2
R
0.537
0.921
N
5860
5860
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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Matched data
In Table 7.2, we report results on the effects of CRS participation of NFIP
policies-in-force for matched data. The results are based on Mundlak’s random-effects
and fixed-effects models. The results for both approaches show a positive relationship
and significant between CRS participation and NFIP policies-in-force. That is, a discrete
change in CRS participation increases the number of NFIP policies-in-force by 188.1
percent and 176.8 percent respectively, ceteris paribus. In both estimation approaches,
the time trend variable show that overall, the number of NFIP policies-in-force increases
by 4.9 percent but the growth of the number of NFIP policies-in-force for CRS
communities over time (as shown by the variable, CRS x Time trend) is slower, ceteris
paribus.
Among the socioeconomic variables, income still remains the only significant
socioeconomic variable influencing the number of NFIP policies-in-force as shown in
Table 7.2. In both estimation approaches, a $1000 increase in income increases the
number of NFIP policies-in-force by 1.1 percent. This positive relationship follows our
hypothesized relationship between income and the number of NFIP policies-in-force.
The negative relationship between education and the number of NFIP policies-in-force is
not what we expected. The estimate however, is not significant. Household also shows
up positive but not significant. This positive effect is not surprising because where
properties are located in SFHA insurance purchase is mandatory for federally backed
mortgages. Hence if household increase in such area, then we can expect flood policies
to also increase.
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Although precipitation is significant in both estimation approaches, the sign is not
as expected. That is, we observe that in both estimation approaches, a one inch increase
in precipitation reduces the number of NFIP policies-in-force by 0.2 percent, ceteris
paribus. The slope variable is also found to be negative and significant in explaining
NFIP policies-in-force. That is, a one degree increase in the slope reduces the number of
NFIP policies-in-force by 39.3 percent, ceteris paribus. One reason that accounts for this
finding is that properties are located along the slope rather than the base of the slope
which makes them less prone to floods. SFHA is positive and significant in explaining
the number of NFIP policies-in-force. This finding is as expected given the high flood
risk nature of SFHA. That is we observe that a one percent increase in land area in
SFHA increases the number of NFIP policies-in-force by 3.4 percent ceteris paribus.
Elevation and stream density are also positive but not significant. The positive
relationship between elevation and the number of NFIP policies-in-force is in line with
our hypothesis. Also the positive relationship existing between stream density and the
number of NFIP policies-in-force is as expected given that communities with bigger
stream density are prone to flood risk.
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Table 7.2

NFIP policies-in-force (matched data)
Mundlak’s Random-effects

Variable

Fixed-effects

Coefficient

robust
Coefficient
robust
std. errors
std. errors
Time-Varying Variables
CRS
1.058***
0.332
1.018***
0.268
CRS×Time trend
-0.042**
0.019
-0.042***
0.016
CRS×Post-Katrina
0.021
0.101
0.033
0.097
Time trend
0.049***
0.012
0.049***
0.012
Post-Katrina
0.108
0.085
0.083
0.072
Education
-0.00033
0.008
-0.001
0.010
Household
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.007
Income
0.011**
0.005
0.011*
0.006
Precipitation
-0.002**
0.001
-0.002*
0.001
Time-Invariant Geospatial Variables
Coast
0.582
0.456
Coast×Post-Katrina
-0.085
0.173
Mississippi
0.052
0.383
Slope
-0.393***
0.128
Elevation
0.002
0.001
Stream density
0.127
0.426
SFHA
3.436***
0.830
Non-SFHA
-0.152
0.496
Constant
-0.345
3.516
Mundlak Group Means
CRS mean
1.083***
0.341
Education mean
0.019
0.016
Household mean
0.023***
0.006
Income mean
0.004
0.014
Precipitation mean
0.041
0.061
2
R
0.598
0.922
N
1840
1840
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
Effects of CRS participation on Damage Claims (log of Damage Claims Payment)
Here also we consider unmatched and matched data. We first report results based
on the unmatched data.
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Unmatched data
In Table 7.3, we show results for Mundlak’s random-effects and fixed-effects
estimation approach. Based on the two estimation approaches, we find a positive but not
significant relationship between CRS participation and damage claims payments.
Although this result is not significant, we did not expect a positive relationship. The
positive relationship could be due to the fact that most CRS communities are coastal
communities that are severely affected by tidal wave actions. Moreover since NFIP
participation is high for CRS communities as we found in the previous results (Table 7.1
and 7.2), it is not very surprising to see a positive relationship between damage claims
payments in CRS participation. Although we do not report here, we observed from our
data that most CRS communities are above CRS class 7 which means the degree of
mitigation practice is low. The parameter estimate for the log of coverage also shows a
positive and significant relationship between the amount of coverage purchased and
damage claims payments. That is, we observe that a percent change in the amount of
coverage purchased increases damage claims payments by 0.5 percent, ceteris paribus.
For socioeconomic variables, both the Mundlak’s random-effects and the fixedeffects approaches show a positive and significant relationship between households and
damage claims payments. That is, a 1000 increase in households increase damage claims
payments by 3.5 percent, ceteris paribus. Highflied and Brody (2013) find a positive
relationship between population and total damage claims payments. Both estimation
approaches also show a positive relationship between education and damage claims
payments but not significant. Although this relationship is not significant, the positive
relationship could mean that education leads to higher earnings which also empower
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people to flood policy and properties that have high value. As such a damage event will
increase claims damage payments. For both estimation approaches, we also find income
to be positive but not significant in explaining damage claims payments. Although this
finding is not significant, the positive relationship is intuitive because, within a
community, wealthier households may have a higher property value and therefore can
claim higher damage claim payments when a damage event occurs.
On geospatial variables, for both estimation approaches, we find precipitation to
be positive and significantly related to damage claims payments. That is, a one inch
increase in precipitation increases damage claims payments by 13.3 percent, ceteris
paribus. This finding is in line with our hypothesized relationship between precipitation
and damage claims payments. Spekkers et al. (2013), find a positive relationship
between precipitation and the number of damage claims. For the time-invariant
geospatial variables, results are reported for only the Mundlak’s random-effects
approach. We find a positive and significant relationship between coast and damage
claims payments as hypothesized. A discrete change in coast increases damage claims by
277.4 percent, ceteris paribus. Coastal communities are exposed to high wave velocity
actions; this finding is therefore not surprising. The results also show a positive and
significant relationship between Mississippi and damage claims payments. That is
relative to Alabama, damage claims in Mississippi increase by 207.3 percent, ceteris
paribus. This result may be explained by the fact that Mississippi has a longer coast line
relative to Alabama hence any hurricane or wave action should have a greater impact on
Mississippi. Also flooding from the Mississippi river could account for the differences.
Slope is positive but not significant in predicting damage claims payments. Although this
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is not significant, the reason for this relationship is that properties in a community may be
located at the base of a slope which makes them prone to floods, ceteris paribus. The
negative relationship between elevation and damage claims payments is as expected,
although the parameter estimate is not significant. The results also show that stream
density is negative but not significant in predicting damage claims payments. This
finding is not in line with our hypothesis. SFHA shows up as positively related to
damage claims payments but not significant. The positive relationship between SFHA
and damage claims payments is in line with our hypothesis significant. Non-SFHA is
negative in explaining damage claims payments as expected, the parameter estimates is
however not significant. Since non-SFHA is an area with moderate or minimal flood
risk, this relationship found is not surprising.
We observe here that unlike the effects of CRS participation on NFIP policies-inforce, we include year dummies and report their estimates when considering the effects of
CRS participation on damage claims payments. This is because here we find parameter
estimates for different years to be significant and different from each other in explaining
damage claims payments. For both estimation approaches, the parameter estimate for the
year 2005 shows up as positive and significant as expected. That is, relative to the year
1994, the year 2005 saw damage claims payments increase by 278.5 percent ceteris
paribus. This result is not surprising given the fact that hurricane Katrina which
destroyed properties mostly in the coastal communities and its surrounding communities
occurred that year. Bin, Bishop, and Kousky (2012) notes that Alabama and Mississippi
are states two states among five to have recorded high damage claims payments due to
hurricane Katrina. Parameter estimates for other years such as 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000,
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2003, and 2011 are also positively related to damage claims payments but are not
significant. For both estimation approaches, the parameter estimates for the years 2002,
2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2013 are negative and significantly related to damage claims
payments. More interestingly, we see a decline in damage claims right after the year
2005 (hurricane Katrina year) which is not surprising.
Table 7.3

Damage claims payments (unmatched data)
Mundlak’s Random-effects

Variable
CRS
Log(coverage)
Education
Household
Income
Precipitation
Coast
Mississippi
Slope
Elevation
Stream density
SFHA
Non-SFHA
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Coefficient

Fixed-effects

robust
Coefficient
std. errors
Time-Varying Variables
0.703
0.670
0.703
0.482***
0.108
0.482***
0.007
0.026
0.007
0.035**
0.015
0.035**
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.133***
0.011
0.133***
Time-Invariant Geospatial Variables
1.328**
0.507
1.309***
0.235
0.152
0.111
-0.0004
0.001
-0.319
0.275
0.665
0.762
-0.188
0.535
Year dummy
0.438
0.294
0.438
-0.263
0.293
-0.263
-0.404
0.281
-0.404
0.496
0.328
0.496
0.435
0.33
0.435
0.720
0.448
0.72
-0.438
0.383
-0.438
-1.221***
0.379
-1.221***
0.209
0.41
0.209
-0.295
0.439
-0.295
72

robust
std.errors
0.691
0.111
0.027
0.016
0.017
0.011

0.302
0.301
0.289
0.338
0.339
0.461
0.394
0.39
0.422
0.452

Table 7.3 (continued)
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Constant

1.331***
0.405
1.331***
0.417
-1.170***
0.413
-1.17***
0.425
-0.448
0.47
-0.448
0.485
-0.813**
0.385
-0.813***
0.396
-0.967**
0.407
-0.967***
0.419
-0.722
0.497
-0.722
0.512
0.260
0.468
0.26
0.482
-1.038**
0.515
-1.038*
0.53
-2.191***
0.501
-2.191***
0.516
3.355
2.521
Mundlak Group Means
CRS mean
0.119
0.501
Education mean
-0.009
0.829
Household mean
-0.008
0.030
Income mean
-0.032
0.016
Precipitation mean
-0.136***
0.025
Log(coverage) mean
0.551***
0.043
2
R
0.310
0.417
N
5860
5860
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
Matched data
Results presented in Table 7.4 are based on random-effects model. The results
show a positive but not significant relationship between CRS participation and damage
claims payments. This relationship is not as expected. We hypothesized a negative
relationship. The parameter estimate for log coverage is positive and significant in
explaining damage claims payments. That is, ceteris paribus, a percent change in
coverage amount purchased leads to 1.1 percent increases damage claims payments. This
result is not surprising as people with more coverage amount are expected to receive
higher damage claims payments should a flood damage event occur.
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On socioeconomic variables, we find household to be positive and significant in
explaining damage claims payments. Specifically, a 1000 increase in household
increases damage claims payments by 2.6 percent, ceteris paribus. This finding is not
suprising as Highfield and Brody (2013) also find a positive and significant relationship
between population and total damage claims payments, although not the same magnitude.
The parameter estimate for income is positive but not significant. Although this is not
significant, this relationship is not surprising because, as explained earlier when income
increases, households are able to afford high value properties and when a damage event
occurs, higher claims payments are demanded by these households, ceteris paribus.
Education shows up as negatively related to damage claims but this is not significant.
This could mean that homeowners who are educated are more likely to practice
individual flood mitigation thereby reducing damage claims payments.
On geospatial variables, we find a positive relationship between precipitation and
damage claims payments as hypothesized. A one inch increase in precipitation increases
damage claims payments by 10.2 percent, ceteris paribus. Highfield and Brody, (2013)
also find a positive relationship between precipitation and damage claims payments.
Coast shows up as positively related to damage claims payments as we hypothesized, but
this is not significant. Parameter estimate for Mississippi also shows that a discrete
change in Mississippi leads to an increase of 683.0 percent in damage claims payments,
ceteris paribus. This finding can be explained by the fact that, Mississippi has a longer
shoreline relative to Alabama and as such are more exposed to wave actions. Slope
shows up to be positive and significant in predicting damage claims payments. This
positive relationship may arise due to the fact that properties are located at the base of
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slopes exposing them to floods ceteris paribus. Highfield and Brody (2013) also find a
positive relationship between slope and total damage claims payments, although their
estimate is not significant. Stream density shows up as negative and significant in
predicting damage claims payments but this relationship is not what we expected.
Results also show that SFHA has positive relationship with damage claims payments as
we hypothesized, although the parameter estimate is not significant. As explained earlier
in chapter II of this research, this area is an area classified as a high flood risk area, so it
is not surprising to see a positive relationship as we hypothesized between SFHA and
damage claims payments. Non-SFHA and elevation, although are negative as we
hypothesized but the parameter estimates are not significant.
The parameter estimates of year dummies in this model are all (except the year
2005) negatively related to damage claims payments. The dummy for the year 2005,
although positively related to damage claims payments, it is not significant. Here also, we
see that immediately after the year 2005 (the year hurricane Katrina strikes the Gulf
Coast), damage claims payments reduces significantly from the year 2006 to the end of
our study period (2013). This finding is not surprising as the hurricane caused damages
to many properties.
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Table 7.4

Damage claims payments (matched data)
Random-effects

Variable
CRS
Log(coverage)
Education
Household
Income
Precipitation
Coast
Mississippi
Slope
Elevation
Stream density
SFHA
Non-SFHA
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Coefficient

Robust std. error

Time-Varying Variables
0.645
1.091***
-0.024
0.026***
0.009
0.102***
Time-Invariant Geospatial Variables
0.490
2.058***
0.551**
-0.002
-1.558*
0.068
-0.082
Year dummy
-1.068*
-1.421**
-0.694
-0.887
-0.627
-1.840**
-0.953
-2.479***
-0.035
-2.113***
0.978
-4.178***
-3.670***
-2.608***
-2.727***
-4.443***
-2.287***
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0.479
0.166
0.021
0.006
0.020
0.019
0.676
0.596
0.267
0.002
0.800
1.346
0.68
0.599
0.577
0.505
0.618
0.645
0.715
0.596
0.691
0.679
0.804
0.662
0.655
0.777
0.626
0.662
0.697
0.817

Table 7.4 (continued)
2012
-2.354***
0.816
2013
-4.591***
0.767
Constant
-0.111
1.612
2
R
0.289
N
1840
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
Positive damage claims payments
Table 7.5 show results based on only positive damage claims payments (those
greater than zero). The estimation approach used here are the Mundlak’s random-effects
and the fixed-effects approach. Across the two estimation approaches, results show that
damage claims payments are reducing among CRS participating communities, although
this is not significant. This finding is in line with our hypothesis. One of the goals of the
CRS is to reduce flood damages among participating communities through local-level
flood mitigation practices. The parameter estimate for log of coverage amount purchased
shows up as positive and significant in predicting damage claims. Specifically we find
that a percent increase in coverage amount purchased, increases the percent of damage
claims payments by 0.7 percent ceteris paribus.
Considering the socioeconomic variables, we find that education and household
have positive a sign although only household is significant in explaining damage claims
payments. The positive relationship between household and damage claims payment
could mean that increase in households increases the demand of insurance policy which
subsequently increases damage claims payments due to the occurrence of a flood damage
event, ceteris paribus. Also, the positive relationship we see between education and
damage claims payments is intuitive in that, higher education can affect earnings and
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subsequently influence demand for flood policy and properties, ceteris paribus. Results
also show a negative relationship between income and damage claims payments.
Although in our hypothesis we were uncertain about the sign, this finding can be
supported by fact that policy holders’ motivation to file for damage claims payments can
reduce as they become wealthier (Cummins and Tennyson 1996).
Precipitation, the only geospatial variable that is time-varying in our research
shows up as positive and significant in explaining damage claims payments. That is, we
find that a one inch increase in precipitation increases damage claims payments by 6.6
percent, ceteris paribus. This relationship is in line with our hypothesis. Highfield and
Brody (2013) also find a positive relationship between precipitation and total damage
claims payments, although not of the same magnitude.
For both estimation approaches, year dummies for 1995, 1998, 1999, 2005, and
2011 are all positive and significant in explaining damage claims payments. Although
these years are all positive and significant, the magnitude of the parameter estimate for
year 2005 stands out. That is, we observe that for the Mundlak’s random-effects
approach, the year 2005, relative to year 1994, damage claims payments increases by
513.5 percent whiles for the fixed-effects, damage claims payments increases by 637.4
percent, ceteris paribus. This outstanding effect can be attributed to hurricane Katrina.
We also find that for the years 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2013,
damage claims payments are reducing relative to the year 1994. However, only the year
2009 is significant in explaining damage claims payments.
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Table 7.5

Damage claims payments (positive claims: non-zero)
Mundlak’s Random-effects

Variable
CRS
Log(coverage)
Education
Household
Income
Precipitation
Coast
Mississippi
Slope
Elevation
Stream density
SFHA
Non-SFHA
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Constant

Coefficient

Fixed-effects

robust
Coefficient
std. errors
Time-Varying Variables
-0.161
0.278
-0.163
0.682***
0.121
0.687***
0.031
0.02
0.024
0.011*
0.006
0.010
-0.014
0.012
-0.020
0.066***
0.009
0.068***
Time-Invariant Geospatial Variables
0.824***
0.229
0.186
0.140
0.098
0.065
-0.0003
0.001
0.000
0.192
0.911
0.571
0.416
0.447
Year dummy
0.740***
0.246
0.708***
-0.291
0.274
-0.289
-0.139
0.248
-0.145
0.993***
0.287
1.011**
0.797**
0.326
0.973**
0.436
0.363
0.761*
-0.218
0.31
-0.032
-0.222
0.316
-0.187
0.392
0.319
0.530
0.022
0.351
0.244
1.814***
0.394
1.998***
-0.200
0.344
-0.080
-0.462
0.458
-0.343
0.174
0.33
0.271
-0.725**
0.336
-0.683*
0.191
0.416
0.221
0.891**
0.350
1.026**
0.228
0.355
0.482
-0.510
0.380
-0.450
7.776***
1.122
79

robust
std.errors
0.303
0.145
0.023
0.007
0.013
0.011

0.273
0.290
0.270
0.322
0.385
0.392
0.345
0.36
0.379
0.386
0.441
0.403
0.518
0.36
0.414
0.554
0.436
0.453
0.504

Table 7.5 (continued)
Mundlak Group Means
CRS mean
0.220
0.356
Education mean
-0.028
0.021
Household mean
-0.008
0.007
Income mean
0.012
0.014
Precipitation mean
-0.047***
0.016
Log(coverage) mean
-0.412***
0.132
2
R
0.268
0.423
N
1807
1807
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
Effect of Community-level Specific CRS Mitigation activities on NFIP participation
(log of policies-in-force)
Results presented under this heading apply to only CRS participating
communities. That is, we focus on within CRS communities to analyze the relative
effects of the individual CRS mitigation activities on NFIP participation. From Table
7.6, we present results based on the Mundlak’s random-effects and the fixed-effects
estimation approaches. Whiles results from the Mundlak’s random-effects approach
shows a negative but insignificant relationship between elevation certificate activity, and
the number of NFIP policies-in-force, parameter estimate from the fixed-effects
estimation approach shows a negative but also significant relationship. For elevation
certificate (c310) activity, CRS communities receive credit points for ensuring that new
buildings in flood risk areas are elevated above some base-level. It is therefore not
surprising to observe a negative and significant relationship (based on the fixed-effects).
That is, when property owners have buildings elevated above some base-level, they feel
safer and therefore don’t see the need to buy flood policy ceteris paribus. Map
information service (c320) also shows up as negative for the Mundlak’s random-effects
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and positive for the fixed-effects approach but not significant under the two estimation
approaches. This activity makes available information regarding flood insurance rate
maps (FIRM) to community residents. In both estimation approaches, outreach project
(c330) activity is positive and significant in explaining the number of NFIP policies-inforce. This finding is as expected because the outreach project activity involves the
dissemination of information regarding flood hazard, flood insurance, as well as flood
protection measures to community residents. Hazard disclosure (c340), flood protection
information (c350), and flood protection assistance (c360) are all negative but not
significant in explaining the number of NFIP policies-in-force. Hazard disclosure (c340)
involves notifying potential homeowners of flood-prone areas hence the negative
relationship between hazard disclosure (c340) and the number of NFIP policies-in-force
is not surprising. Also, for flood protection information (c350) activity, CRS
communities are supposed to make available at the community libraries or website, flood
protection information such as flood insurance, as such the negative relationship between
this activity and the number of NFIP policies-in-force is not as expected. Flood
protection assistance (c360) activity involves providing property owners with technical
advice as to effective ways of securing their buildings from flooding. The negative
relationship found between flood protection assistance and the number of NFIP policiesin-force could mean that homeowners feel secured when given such technical advice
hence might prefer not to purchase flood policy.
Results based on the two estimation approaches show that floodplain mapping
(c410) activity is negative and significant in explaining the number of NFIP policies-inforce. This relationship is as expected given that this activity involves the provision of
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new flood elevation standards and delineating flood ways for areas that are not yet
mapped onto FIRM. That is elevation, and delineation of flood ways reduces flood risk
hence not surprising that this activity is negatively related to the number of NFIP
policies-in-force. Open space preservation (c420) activity also show up as negative but
not significant in predicting the number of NFIP policies-in-force. CRS communities
that practice this activity ensure that undeveloped floodplains are protected from any
future developments; hence it is intuitive that this activity is negatively related to the
number of NFIP policies-in-force. For Mundlak’s random-effects, higher regulatory
standards (c430) activity is negatively related to the number of NFIP policies-in-force but
shows up positive for the fixed-effects estimation approach. However, they are not
significant. This activity involves establishing regulations that seek to protect areas with
special flood hazards, as well as provide standards for coastal constructions. Also, for
both estimation approaches, parameter estimates for flood data maintenance (c440)
activity are positive and significant. For CRS communities that practice flood data
maintenance activity, CRS credit points are awarded for data management such as storing
data on flood and property on computers. The data are made available to insurance
companies for insurance rating purposes. The positive relationship between flood data
maintenance activity and the number of NFIP policies-in-force is therefore not surprising
as this activity can provide information to the insurance company so as to adjust
premium. The result also shows a positive relationship existing between storm water
management (c450) and number of NFIP policies-in-force but this is only significant for
fixed-effects estimation approach. This activity involves the regulation of new
constructions in the water-shed to reduce soil erosion and improve water quality, as well
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as ensure good post-development runoffs. We are not surprise to see the effect to be
positive.
Floodplain management planning (c510) turns out to be negatively related to the
number of NFIP policies-in-force but this is only significant for the Mundlak’s randomeffects. This finding is as expected because this activity involves the adoption and
implementation of flood hazard mitigation. That is where flood hazard mitigation leads
to a reduction of flood damages, demand for flood policy will reduce ceteris paribus. We
also find that for both estimation approaches, there is a negative relationship between
acquisition and relocation (c520) but this is not significant. This activity involves
acquiring or relocating buildings from flood-prone areas. The sign is as expected since
this activity reduces flood risk hence there will be no need of buying flood policy. For
both estimation approaches, we find a negative and significant relationship between flood
protection (c530) activity and the number of NFIP policies-in-force. Flood protection
activity involves the provision of protection such as floodproofing and elevation to
already existing properties in a floodplain. Since this is a way of mitigating against flood
risk, it is expected that as communities practice this activity homeowners’ flood risk will
reduce and therefore lead to a reduction in flood policy demand, ceteris paribus.
Considering Mundlak’s random-effects approach, we find drainage system maintenance
(c540) to be negatively related to the number of NFIP policies-in-force but this is not
significant. On the other hand, the fixed-effects approach shows a positive relationship.
This activity involves a periodic removal of debris in drainage system, and inspections of
channels hence it is expected that removal of debris will clear the drainage system and
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therefore give free passage to runoffs thereby reducing flood risk and hence reduce the
number of NFIP policies-in-force, ceteris paribus.
In both estimation approaches, parameter estimates for flood warning and
responses (c610) and dam safety (c630) are negative but not significant in explaining the
number of NFIP policies-in-force. For flood warning and response (c610), community
residents receive early warnings of possible floods as well as flood response plans which
makes them more prepared ahead of any flood impact. Dam safety activity ensures that
dams are properly managed to prevent any possible collapse. Although the parameter
estimates for these activities are not significant, the signs are as expected. That is, these
activities can reduce the damage caused by the floods thereby reducing flood risk and
subsequently, the number of NFIP policies-in-force.
With regards to the control variables, the two estimation approaches show that
overall number of policies-in-force increases over time, although not significant. On the
other hand, in the two estimation approaches, the Post-Katrina variable is found to be
positive and significant. That is, we find that a discrete change in Post-Katrina increases
the number of NFIP policies-in-force by 37.2 percent (for fixed-effects approach) whiles
for Mundlak’s random-effects, the increase is 15.3 percent, ceteris paribus. Gallagher
(2013) has shown that flood insurance demand increases after a flood event has occurred.
For the two estimation approaches, parameter estimates for education and
household show that they are positively related to the number of NFIP policies-in-force,
although the estimates are not significant. Again, this finding is not surprising as Smith
and Baquet (1996) also find a positive and significant relationship between education and
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demand for crop insurance indicating that education has a positive effect on insurance
demand.
On the socioeconomic controls, we find that for both estimation approaches, the
relationship between income and the number of NFIP policies-in-force is positive and
significant. That is we find that a $1000 increase in income increases the number of
NFIP policies-in-force by 0.8 percent. This finding supports that of past studies (Browne
and Hoyt 2000; Petrolia et al. 2015) that have found a positive relationship between
income and demand for insurance.
With regards to geospatial controls, precipitation is positive in explaining number
of NFIP policies-in-force as expected, although this is not significant. Time-invariant
geospatial controls reported for Mundlak’s random-effects estimation approach shows
that a discrete change in coast leads to an unexpected reduction in the number of NFIP
policies-in-force, although this is not significant. However, there is a significant growth
of the number of NFIP policies-in-force in the coast after hurricane Katrina, ceteris
paribus. We also find that relative to Alabama, the number of NFIP policies-in-force
increases in Mississippi, although this is not significant. Parameter estimate for slope
shows that a one degree increase in slope reduces the number of NFIP policies-in-force
by 70.6 percent. This relationship is as expected because properties located along a slope
should have little or no risk of flood since rainwater can easily drain away. The results
also show that a one percent increase in land area in SFHA increases the number of NFIP
policies-in-force by 4.0 percent. This relationship is as expected given that the SFHA is
an area classified as high flood risk area. The parameter estimate for non-SFHA also
reveals that a one percent increase in the land area in non-SFHA increase the number of
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NFIP policies-in-force by 1.8 percent. Given that non-SFHA is an area of moderate to
low flood risk, we expected the number of NFIP policies-in-force to be reducing.
Elevation also shows up as positive but not significant in explaining the number of
policies-in-force. This finding is not what we expected, however, communities with high
elevation might not necessarily have good slopes which still expose residents to flood.
Table 7.6

NFIP policies-in-force (Unmatched)
Mundlak’s Random-effects

Variables
Elevation Certificate (c310)
Map Inf. Service (c320)
Outreach Project (c330)
Hazard Disclosure (c340)
Flood Protection Info.(c350)
Flood Protection Ass. (c360)
Floodplain Mapping (c410)
Open Space Pres. (c420)
Higher Reg. Strd.(c430)
Flood data Mtn (c440)
Storm Water Mgt (c450)
Floodplain Mgt. Plng.(c510)
Acquisition & Reloc.(c520)
Flood Protection (c530)
Drainage Sys. Mtn.(c540)
Flood Warn. & Resp. (c610)
Dam Safety (c630)
Time trend
Post-Katrina
Education
Household
Income
Precipitation

Coefficients

robust
std.errors
Time-Varying Variables
-0.046
0.161
-0.079
0.103
0.186***
0.071
-0.214
0.191
-0.183
0.180
-0.085
0.135
-0.256***
0.082
-0.007
0.025
-0.0003
0.020
0.158***
0.052
0.090
0.059
-0.087*
0.048
-0.012
0.025
-0.635***
0.218
-0.010
0.029
-0.059
0.076
-0.315
0.263
0.010
0.013
0.142**
0.062
0.002
0.006
0.002
0.003
0.008***
0.003
0.001
0.001
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Fixed-effects
Coefficients
-0.295*
0.055
0.193**
-0.120
-0.219
-0.030
-0.269***
-0.013
0.019
0.119*
0.129*
-0.072
-0.030
-0.509**
0.017
-0.061
-0.366
0.008
0.316***
0.006
0.002
0.008***
0.0001

robust
std.errors
0.167
0.110
0.082
0.230
0.211
0.144
0.081
0.031
0.025
0.069
0.068
0.058
0.031
0.255
0.040
0.072
0.276
0.012
0.080
0.007
0.003
0.003
0.001

Table 7.6 (continued)
Time-Invariant Geospatial Variables
Coast
-0.502
0.652
Coast×Post-Katrina
0.407***
0.122
Mississippi
0.645
3.842
Slope
-0.706***
0.199
Elevation
0.0004
0.001
Stream density
-0.215
0.273
SFHA
3.963***
0.672
Non-SFHA
1.833**
0.833
Constant
2.323
2.836
Mundlak Group Means
Mean Elev. Cert.(c310p)
0.152
1.558
Mean Map Inf. Service (c320)
0.737
0.535
Mean Outreach Project (c330)
0.737
0.535
Mean Hazard Disclosure (c340)
0.353
1.173
Mean Flood Protection Info. (c350)
0.325
1.310
Mean Flood Protection Ass. (c360)
-1.527
0.976
Mean Fldplain Mapping (c410)
0.671
0.717
Mean Open Space Pres. (c420)
-0.632***
0.237
Mean Higher Reg. Strd (c430)
-0.272*
0.159
Mean Flood data Mtn (c440)
0.870
0.698
Mean Storm Water Mgt (c450)
-0.245
0.719
Mean Fldplain Mgt Planng (c510)
0.691**
0.336
Mean Acquisition & Reloc.(c520)
-0.0660
0.147
Mean Flood Protection (c530)
2.450**
1.168
Mean Drainage Syst.Mtn (c540)
-0.439**
0.205
Mean Flood Warn. & Resp. (c610)
0.594
0.456
Mean Dam Safety (c630)
-2.241
6.081
Mean of Education
0.065**
0.026
Mean of Household
0.029***
0.009
Mean of Income
-0.044**
0.021
Mean of Precipitation
0.044
0.060
2
R
0.878
0.982
N
528
528
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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Effect of Community-level Specific CRS Mitigation activities on the log of Damage
Claims Payments
In Table 7.7 we present results on the estimates of the individual CRS mitigation
effects on damage claims payments. The estimates are based on the pooled model. The
results show that elevation certificate (c310), damages hazard disclosure (c340), flood
protection information (c350), flood protection assistance (c360), higher regulation
standards (c430), storm water management (c450), drainage system maintenance (c540),
and flood warning and response (c610) are all negatively related to damage claims
payments as expected, but only flood protection information (c350) and storm water
management (c450) are significant. Although the parameter estimates of some of these
activities are not significant they deserve some explanation. The negative effect of
elevation certificate (c310) on damage claims payments is not surprising given that the
activity ensures that buildings in flood risk areas are elevated above some base-level in
order to reduce flood. Highfield and Brody (2013) did not consider this activity in their
study. Also, the negative relationship between Hazard disclosure (c340) and damage
claims payments is as expected because for this activity, potential homeowners are
notified of flood-prone areas so they can avoid any plans of developing the area. That is,
when developers avoid developing such high risk areas, then we should expect damage
claims payments to decline. This activity is also not considered by Highfield and Brody
(2013). The negative relationship between flood protection information (c350) and
damage claims payments is as expected since this activity ensures information on floods
are provided on community’s website and libraries to inform residents as to how to
secure their properties from floods. Also, practicing flood protection assistance (c360)
activity ensures that property owners receive technical advice as to effective ways of
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securing their buildings from flooding hence the negative effect of this activity on
damage claims payment is intuitive. Again, Highfield and Brody (2013) did not consider
this activity in their study. The relationship between higher regulatory standards (c430)
and damage claims payments is also as expected. This activity involves putting in place
regulations to secure areas with special flood hazards. Highfield and Brody (2013), finds
a positive but not significant relationship between higher regulatory standards (c430) and
total damage claims. For storm water management (c450) activity, CRS communities
that practice Storm water management (c450) activity ensures that new developments do
not lead to soil erosion, and also ensures that good water quality is maintained. Highfield
and Brody (2013) find a positive but not significant relationship between the Storm water
management activity and damage claims payments. The relationship between drainage
system maintenance (c540) and damage claims payments is not surprising because the
periodic removal of debris in drainage system and inspections of channels should reduce
flood risk, hence a reduction in damage claims payments. This activity is not considered
in Highfield and Brody (2013) study. The negative relationship between flood warning
and response (c610) activity and damage claims payments is intuitive because, early
warnings of possible floods as well as flood response plans gives residents enough time
to evacuate the area and if possible relocate mobile properties. Again, Highfield and
Brody (2013) did not account for this activity.
The results also show that map information service (c320), outreach project
(c330), floodplain mapping (c410), open space preservation (c420), flood data
maintenance (c440), floodplain management planning (c510), acquisition and relocation
(c520), flood protection (c530), and dam safety (c630) are all positive in explaining
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damage claims payments, but only floodplain management planning (c510), and
acquisition and relocation (c520) are significant. The positive relationship found between
map information service (c320) activity and damage claims payments is not as expected
because provision of flood maps to community residents are supposed to warn them of
flood risk areas to avoid. Outreach project (c330) involves providing information on
flood hazard and flood protection to residents to help them make better decisions that will
reduce flood damages. The positive relationship existing between this activity and
damage claims payments is not what we expected. Also the positive effect of floodplain
mapping (c410) activity on damage claims payments is not as expected. This activity
involves the provision of new flood elevation standards, delineating flood ways, for areas
that are not yet mapped onto FIRM. Highfield and Brody (2013) also find a positive
relationship between floodplain mapping (c410) and damage claims payments but their
estimate is also not significant. The positive relationship between open space
preservation (c420) and damage claims payments is not as expected since this activity
ensures that undeveloped floodplains are protected from any future developments. In
Highfield and Broody (2013) study, they find a negative and significant relationship
between open space preservation (c420) and total damage claims payments. CRS
communities practicing flood data maintenance (c440) activity ensures that data on
floods and property are stored on computers and made available for use, especially by
insurance companies for insurance rating purposes. Highfield and Brody (2013) also find
a positive relationship between flood data maintenance (c440) and total damage claims
payments but their estimated effect is not significant. Also our finding on the
relationship between floodplain management planning (c510) and damage claims
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payments is not as expected. For this activity, communities adopt and implement flood
hazard mitigation with the aim of reducing damage claims. Although Highfield and
Brody (2013) find a negative relationship between floodplain management planning
(c510) activity and damage claims payments, their estimated effect is not significant.
Parameter estimate for acquisition and relocation (c520) is positive and significant in
explaining damage claims payments. This finding is not as expected since this activity
seeks to reduce damage claims by acquiring and or relocating buildings prone to floods.
Highfield and Brody (2013) also find a positive relationship between acquisition and
relocation (c520), and damage claims payments but their estimated effect is not
significant. The positive relationship between flood protection (c530) and damage claims
payments is not as expected because this activity involves the provision of protection
such as floodproofing and elevation to already existing properties in a floodplain.
Highfield and Brody (2013) find a positive relationship between damage claims classified
under non-SFHA and flood protection (c530) activity, although not significant. The
positive effect of dam safety (c630) on damage claims payments is surprising given that
this activity ensures that dams are prevented from collapsing and thereby not causing any
destruction to surrounding properties. Highfield and Brody (2013) did not consider this
activity in their study.
The results in Table 7.7 also show that there is a positive and significant
relationship between the amount of coverage purchased and damage claims payments.
That is we find that a percent increase in the amount of coverage purchased increases
damage claims payments by 1.5 percent, ceteris paribus. The positive and significant
relationship between household and damage claims payments is as expected because
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when more households buy flood policy and a flood damage event occurs, then we
should expect damage claims payments to also increase, ceteris paribus. The parameter
estimate for education also shows that it is positively related to damage claims payments
although this is not significant. A reason for this positive effect is that, higher education
can lead to higher income which can also affects demand for flood policy and or acquire
high value properties. This subsequently results in more damage claims payments if a
damage event occurs, ceteris paribus. Income on the other hand shows up as negative
but not significant in explain damage claims payments. As Cummins and Tennyson 1996
notes, increase in wealth of policy holders can reduce their motivation to file for damage
claims payments
For geospatial variables, we find that one inch increase in precipitation increases
damage claims payments by 19.0 percent, ceteris paribus. Highfield and Brody (2013)
also find a positive and significant relationship between precipitation and total damage
claims payments. Results also show that damage claims payments are reducing in coastal
communities although not significant. This is not as expected given that coastal
communities observe high velocity of wave actions. The positive relationship between
Mississippi and damage claims payments is intuitive, although the estimate is not
significant. That is, because Mississippi’s shoreline extends in great length relative to
that of Alabama, properties in Mississippi should be more exposed to wave actions as
compared to Alabama. We also observe that the parameter estimate for slope is positive
but not significant in explaining damage claims payments. Highfield and Brody (2013)
also find a positive but not significant relationship between slope and total damage claims
payments. The parameter estimates for elevation, stream density and non-SFHA are all
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positive but not significant in explaining damage claims payments. The positive
relationship between elevation and damage claims payments is not as expected. However,
a community with a high elevation and poor slope will still face some flood risk, ceteris
paribus. The positive relationship between stream density and damage claims payments
is not surprising given that these streams have the potential of getting flooded. Also, the
relationship between non-SFHA and damage claims payments is not as expected. This is
because the non-SFHA is known to have low or moderate flood risk. Our results also
show that one percent increase in land area in SFHA increases damage claims payments
by 3.7 percent, ceteris paribus. This positive relationship between SFHA and damage
claims payments is as expected given the high flood risk nature of SFHA.
Considering the year dummies, with the exception of the years 2000 and 2005, all
other years are negatively related to damage claims payments. The years 2000 and 2005,
although are positive, they are not significant. The year 2005 is the year when the Gulf
Coast experienced hurricane Katrina. The years after 2005 are negative and significant
(except for 2008, 2011, and 2012) in explaining damage claims payment.
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Table 7.7

Damage claims payments (Unmatched)
Pooled model

Variables

Coefficient

Time-varying variables
Elevation Certificate (c310)
-0.232
Map Inf. Service (c320)
0.479
Outreach Project (c330)
0.398
Hazard Disclosure (c340)
-1.030
Flood Protection Info.(c350)
-3.530**
Flood Protection Ass.(c360)
-1.619
Floodplain Mapping (c410)
0.524
Open Space Pres. (c420)
0.310
Higher Reg. Strd.(c430)
-0.009
Flood data Mtn(c440)
0.972
Storm Water Mgt (c450)
-1.737***
Floodplain Mgt. Plng.(c510)
0.587*
Acquisition & Reloc. (c520)
0.656***
Flood Protection (c530)
2.582
Drainage Sys. Mtn (c540)
-0.008
Flood Warn. & Resp. (c610)
-0.543
Dam Safety (c630)
0.821
Log(coverage)
1.449***
Education
0.006
Household
0.033**
Income
-0.017
Precipitation
0.190***
Time-invariant variables
Coast
-1.313
Mississippi
0.935
Slope
-0.274
Elevation
0.002
Stream density
0.352
SFHA
3.689*
Non-SFHA
0.593
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std. errors
1.747
0.981
0.445
1.390
1.603
1.045
1.349
0.369
0.176
0.647
0.575
0.350
0.161
1.976
0.284
0.475
3.134
0.286
0.013
0.029
0.029
0.013
0.909
2.172
0.35
0.002
0.947
1.902
1.749

Table 7.7 (continued)
Year dummies
1999
-0.754
1.390
2000
0.556
1.468
2001
-1.443
1.302
2002
-2.013
1.328
2000
-1.353
1.364
2004
-0.979
1.361
2005
1.462
1.371
2006
-3.210**
1.484
2007
-3.842**
1.527
2008
-1.282
1.386
2009
-3.478**
1.410
2010
-4.674***
1.624
2011
-1.723
1.650
2012
-2.247
1.564
2013
-5.034***
1.557
Constant
-7.823
3.044
2
R
0.467
N
528
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This research is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to analyze the impact of
CRS participation (versus non-participation) on NFIP participation and damage claims
payments. We employ matching methods to group CRS and non-CRS communities with
similar characteristics in order to eliminate comparison bias. Moreover, we are not aware
of any study that has analyzed the impact of specific CRS mitigation activities on NFIP
participation. This study is also the first to provide empirical findings specific to
Alabama and Mississippi.
We find that regardless of the estimation approach used and whether unmatched
or matched data are used, participation in the CRS program increases NFIP participation.
Zahran et al. (2009) finds a positive relationship between county’s overall CRS points
and NFIP participation. We also observe that although overall NFIP participation
increases over time, the growth in NFIP participation is slower among CRS communities.
That is, we find that the growth in NFIP participation over time for CRS communities is
4.2 percent while overall NFIP participation increase over time is 4.9 percent. Based on
the unmatched data, regardless of the estimation approach, we do find that overall NFIP
participation significantly increases after hurricane Katrina but the growth in NFIP
participation after hurricane Katrina is slower for CRS communities, but only significant
for fixed-effects model. This finding is consistent with that of Gallagher (2014) who
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finds that peoples’ demand for flood insurance increases after a damage event has
occurred. Regardless of using unmatched or matched data, we do not find any difference
in NFIP participation between Alabama and Mississippi. Based on the unmatched data,
we do find that overall, NFIP participation increases by 115.3 percent for coastal
communities relative to non-coastal communities. The finding on the impact of CRS
participation (versus non-participation) on NFIP participation appears to support the goal
of the CRS program in improving NFIP participation. This implies that premium
discounts awarded on individual policies in CRS communities may be motivating
residents to purchase flood policies. However, the slow growth of NFIP over time as
found in this research also raises some concerns, as this may indicate that policy holders
do not keep coverage over time which threatens the goal of the CRS program in
increasing NFIP participation. It could also be that NFIP participation rate in CRS
communities is already higher, hence limited room for growth relative to non-CRS
communities. Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) also notes that over time policy holders
drop coverage quickly. This means that policymakers and FEMA authorities may
consider extending flood policy contracts over longer periods.
With regards to CRS effects on damage claims payments, regardless of the
estimation approach and whether the unmatched or matched data is used, we do not find
any significant effect of CRS participation on damage claims payments. This finding is
unexpected given that the CRS program also aims to reduce or avoid damages to insured
properties. Having said this, our finding regarding a lack of significant impact of CRS
participation on damage claims payments can be explained by the fact that the majority
(93.0 percent) of CRS communities are rated above Class 5 as of 2013, which implies
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that the degree of mitigation practiced is perhaps too low to effect any significant
reduction in flood damages. Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) finds that only Class 5
significantly reduces damage claims payments in Florida. For our data, as of 2013, there
were 3 communities in Class 5, 9 in Class 6, 4 in Class 7, 18 in Class 8, and 9 in Class 9.
We also add that in cases of severe flood damage events (like hurricane Katrina), the
impact of the damage event could overwhelm any mitigation effects. We also observe
that damage claims payments are high for Mississippi relative to Alabama. This is not
surprising, given that Mississippi has a longer coast line relative to Alabama. This
indicates that more properties especially along the coast of Mississippi are subject to
wave actions compared to Alabama. We find that for unmatched data, there is a
significant increase of 277.4 percent in damage claims payments for coastal communities
relative to non-coastal communities.
After analyzing the relationships between the individual CRS mitigation activities
and NFIP participation, we find that regardless of the estimation approach, increased
outreach activity and increased flood data maintenance leads to a significant increase in
NFIP participation. These findings are not surprising because activities such as outreach
(c330), involves dissemination of information on flood risk and flood insurance which
creates the awareness of flood hazard and also the need to buy flood insurance, and hence
has a positive relationship with NFIP participation. Also, flood data maintenance (c440),
as practiced by CRS communities ensures that records on flood and property are
available on computers, the right base maps are used and the right elevation reference
marks are adhered to. That is, flood data maintenance (c440) activity can help update
FIRMs which can further be used to adjust premiums on individual policy especially
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where data shows a reduction in floods and property damages thereby increasing NFIP
participation. On the other hand, increased floodplain mapping and increased flood
protection reduces NFIP participation. Floodplain mapping (c410) involves the
development of new flood elevation, delineating floodways and using more restrictive
mapping standards. Hence its positive effects on damage claims payments indicates that
community residents are well informed of high flood risk areas as indicated on flood
maps and therefore avoid developing or evacuate these areas to safer zones. Also, flood
protection (c530) activity contribution to the reduction of NFIP participation indicates
that retrofitting of buildings and construction of small flood controls are achieving the
aim of reducing flood damages caused to buildings hence property owners feel no need of
buying flood policy.
Also, we find that increased flood protection information (c350), and increased
storm water management (c450) significantly reduces damage claims payments. That is,
the finding on flood protection information (c350, where communities provide flood
insurance and flood protection information at the community libraries and also on its
website) indicates that the resident are making good use of flood hazard and flood
protection information provided in community libraries and on community website.
Residents who are well informed on these issues are more likely to seek measures that
will reduce flood damages to their property, ceteris paribus. Also, it is not surprising that
practicing storm water management (c450, where the community ensures that new
developments do not worsen runoff), activity reduces damage claims payments. This is
because, once a community put the necessary measures in place to ensure that new
constructions are properly positioned, then runoff can be properly directed to follow its
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course so as to reduce flooding and hence reduce damage claims payments. Highfield
and Brody (2013) find a positive relationship between this activity and damage claims
payments although their estimate is not significant. On the other hand, increased
floodplain management planning (c510, which involves the preparation, adoption, and
implementation of comprehensive flood hazard mitigation strategies) and increased
acquisition and relocation (c520, acquiring and or relocating buildings from floodplains)
significantly increase damage claims payments. The positive effects of floodplain
management planning (c510) and acquisition and relocation (c520) on damage claims
payments are very surprising as we expected a negative effect. A possible explanation
for the negative effect between floodplain management planning (c510) and damage
claims payments is that since this activity does not involve any structural mitigation it is
likely that its goal of reducing damages might not be achieved. Highfield and Brody
(2013) however find a negative effect between floodplain management planning (c510)
and total damage claims payments but positive effects between floodplain management
planning (c510) and damage claims payments for SFHA, although the effects are not
significant. Highfield and Brody (2013) also find a positive effect between acquisition
and relocation (c520) but not significant. Although flood mitigation activities are
supposed to reduce damages, could also create a perception that a flood risk area is safe
for inhabiting. Brody et al (2007) notes that flood mitigation activities are encouraging
developments in the floodplains thereby leading to flood damages. These findings on the
effects of specific CRS mitigation activities on NFIP participation indicate that not all
CRS activities motivate NFIP participation, and also not all specific CRS activities
reduced damage claims payments.
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Overall, the CRS program is achieving its goal of increasing NFIP participation
among CRS participating communities. However, communities need to put in more
mitigation effort in order to see some significant effect of the CRS program in reducing
damage claims payments. Future policy changes to the CRS should focus on
encouraging communities to practice more structural mitigation activities.
Limitations
Although this research has addressed some important questions that have not been
answered in previous studies, there are some limitations to this research that need to be
addressed in future studies. First, this study only focused on Mississippi and Alabama as
such findings might not apply to other states. However, this research can serve as a guide
to studying the effect of CRS participation on outcomes in other states. Thus future
research should consider studying a wider set of NFIP communities.
Also, NFIP data used in this research are aggregated at the community-level
which in one way or the other restricts analysis at the household-level. Future research
should therefore consider using NFIP data at the household-level.
Although this research demonstrates the use of matching methods to study the
impact of the CRS program on NFIP participation and damage claims payments,
matching was performed on a subset of our data (the period 2013). We also note,
however, that matching on the full data set (i.e., over all years) leads to a highly
unbalanced panel and therefore possess its own challenges for regression analysis.
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ESTIMATION CODES
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Matching Codes (R codes)
rm(list=ls(all=TRUE))
tic <- proc.time()
library("MatchIt")
library("Hmisc")
library("truncnorm")
library("xtable")
library("WhatIf")
library("Matching")
library("snow")
set.seed(37)
crsdata <- read.table("c:/crs/crsdata.csv", header=TRUE,sep=",", dec=".",
check.names=TRUE)
attach(crsdata)
View(crsdata)
nC <- length(which(crs == 0))
nT <- length(which(crs == 1))
Din <- data.frame(cbind(oid,cid1,miss,coast,crs,hh,inc,educ,
nclaims,paid,pif,premium,cover,pifrate,claimrate,pptmin,pptmax,pptmean,pptstd,elevmin
,elevmax,elevmean,elevstd,slpmin,slpmax,slpmean,slpstd,strdnmin,strdnmax,strdnmean,s
trdnstd,vzone,azone,bzone,czone))
avzones <- I(vzone+azone)
bczones <- I(bzone+czone)
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Y <- crsdata$pifrate
Tr <- crsdata$crs
PSout <- glm(Tr ~ miss+coast+hh+inc+educ+elevmean+slpmean
+strdnmean+avzones+bczones,data=Din,family=binomial)
summary(PSout)
PS <- PSout$fitted
XM <- cbind(miss,coast,hh,inc,educ,elevmean,slpmean,
strdnmean,avzones,bczones,PS)
XB <cbind(XM,I(hh^2),I(inc^2),I(educ^2),I(hh*inc),I(hh*educ),I(inc*educ),I(elevmean^2),I(s
lpmean^2),
I(strdnmean^2),I(elevmean*slpmean),I(elevmean*strdnmean),I(slpmean*strdnmean),
I(avzones^2),I(bczones^2),I(avzones*bczones))
cl <- makeCluster(c(rep("localhost",8)),type="SOCK")
gen1 <- GenMatch(Tr=Tr, X=XM, BalanceMatrix=XB,
estimand="ATT",
M=3,
pop.size=1000,
exact=NULL,
replace=TRUE,
ties=TRUE,
caliper=NULL,
fit.func="pvals",
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cluster=cl,
unif.seed=37,
int.seed=37)
stopCluster(cl)
m1 <- Match(Tr=Tr, X=XM,
estimand="ATT",
M=3,
exact=NULL,
replace=TRUE,
ties=TRUE,
Weight.matrix=gen1)
matchout <- capture.output(MatchBalance(Tr ~
hh+inc+elevmean+slpmean+strdnmean+avzones+bczones+I(hh^2)+I(inc^2)+I(hh*inc)+I
(elevmean^2)+I(slpmean^2)+I(strdnmean^2)+I(elevmean*slpmean)+I(elevmean*strdnm
ean)+I(slpmean*strdnmean)+I(avzones^2)+I(bczones^2)+I(avzones*bczones),data =
crsdata, match.out = m1, nboots = 1000),file="C:/crs/matchout.txt")
iT <- m1$index.treated
iC <- m1$index.control
iAll <- c(iT,iC)
trm1 <- Tr[iAll]
Wopt <- gen1$par
liT <- length(iT)
liC <- length(iC)
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iTu <- unique(m1$index.treated)
liTu <- length(iTu)
iCu <- unique(m1$index.control)
liCu <- length(iCu)
w <- m1$weights
int <- data.frame(cbind(iC,w))
intagg <- aggregate(int,by=list(iC),FUN=sum)
wCagg <- intagg$w
wC <- (wCagg/(length(iTu)))*(length(iCu))
wT <- rep(1,length(iTu))
wvec <- c(wT,wC)
iAllu <- c(iTu,iCu)
oidM <- oid[iAllu]
cid1M <- cid1[iAllu]
Z <- cbind(oidM,cid1M,iAllu,wvec)
write.csv(Z, "c:/crs/wtdata.csv")
png("C:/crs/miss.png")
missm1 <- miss[iAll]
ttm <- table(trm1,missm1)
ttm <- prop.table(ttm,1)
tto <- table(Tr,miss)
tto <- prop.table(tto,1)
tbfaf <- cbind(tto[,2],ttm[,2])
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barplot(tbfaf,ylab="prob",col=c("azure1","azure4"),
main="miss",legend=c("controls","treated"),beside=TRUE,names.arg=c("Before",
"After"))dev.off()
png("C:/crs/coast.png")
coastm1 <- coast[iAll]
ttm <- table(trm1,coastm1)
ttm <- prop.table(ttm,1)
tto <- table(Tr,coast)
tto <- prop.table(tto,1)
tbfaf <- cbind(tto[,2],ttm[,2])
barplot(tbfaf,ylab="prob",col=c("azure1","azure4"),
main="coast",legend=c("controls","treated"),beside=TRUE,names.arg=c("Before",
"After"))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/hhbef.png")
qqplot(crsdata$hh[44:294],crsdata$hh[1:43],xlab="controls",ylab="treated",main="#
households BEFORE",ylim=c(0,30000),xlim=c(0,30000))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/hhaft.png")
qqplot(crsdata$hh[m1$index.control],crsdata$hh[m1$index.treated],xlab="controls",ylab
="treated",main="# households AFTER",ylim=c(0,30000),xlim=c(0,30000))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
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dev.off()
png("C:/crs/incbef.png")
qqplot(crsdata$inc[44:294],crsdata$inc[1:43],xlab="controls",ylab="treated",main="inco
me BEFORE",ylim=c(20000,60000),xlim=c(20000,60000))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/incaft.png")
qqplot(crsdata$inc[m1$index.control],crsdata$inc[m1$index.treated],xlab="controls",yla
b="treated",main="income AFTER",ylim=c(20000,60000),xlim=c(20000,60000))
abline(coef=c(0,1))dev.off()
png("C:/crs/educbef.png")
qqplot(crsdata$educ[44:294],crsdata$educ[1:43],xlab="controls",ylab="treated",main="e
ducation BEFORE",ylim=c(0,0.4),xlim=c(0,0.4))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/educaft.png")
qqplot(crsdata$educ[m1$index.control],crsdata$educ[m1$index.treated],xlab="controls",
ylab="treated",main="education AFTER",ylim=c(0,0.4),xlim=c(0,0.4))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/elevbef.png")qqplot(crsdata$elevmean[44:294],crsdata$elevmean[1:43],xlab
="controls",ylab="treated",main="mean elevation
BEFORE",ylim=c(0,800),xlim=c(0,800))
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abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/elevaft.png")
qqplot(crsdata$elevmean[m1$index.control],crsdata$elevmean[m1$index.treated],xlab="
controls",ylab="treated",main="mean elevation AFTER",ylim=c(0,800),xlim=c(0,800))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/slpbef.png")
qqplot(crsdata$slpmean[44:294],crsdata$slpmean[1:43],xlab="controls",ylab="treated",
main="mean slope BEFORE",ylim=c(0,7),xlim=c(0,7))
abline(coef=c(0,1))dev.off()
png("C:/crs/slpaft.png")
qqplot(crsdata$slpmean[m1$index.control],crsdata$slpmean[m1$index.treated],xlab="co
ntrols",ylab="treated",main="mean slope AFTER",ylim=c(0,7),xlim=c(0,7))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/strdnbef.png")
qqplot(crsdata$strdnmean[44:294],crsdata$strdnmean[1:43],xlab="controls",ylab="treate
d",main="mean stream density BEFORE",ylim=c(0.5,2),xlim=c(0.5,2))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/strdnaft.png")
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qqplot(crsdata$strdnmean[m1$index.control],crsdata$strdnmean[m1$index.treated],xlab
="controls",ylab="treated",main="mean stream density
AFTER",ylim=c(0.5,2),xlim=c(0.5,2))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/avzonesbef.png")
qqplot(avzones[44:294],avzones[1:43],xlab="controls",ylab="treated",main="A+V zones
BEFORE",ylim=c(0,0.9),xlim=c(0,0.9))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/avzonesaft.png")
qqplot(avzones[m1$index.control],avzones[m1$index.treated],xlab="controls",ylab="trea
ted",main="A+V zones AFTER",ylim=c(0,0.9),xlim=c(0,0.9))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
png("C:/crs/bczonesbef.png")
qqplot(bczones[44:294],bczones[1:43],xlab="controls",ylab="treated",main="B+C zones
BEFORE",ylim=c(0,1),xlim=c(0,1))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()

png("C:/crs/bczonesaft.png")
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qqplot(bczones[m1$index.control],bczones[m1$index.treated],xlab="controls",ylab="trea
ted",main="B+C zones AFTER",ylim=c(0,1),xlim=c(0,1))
abline(coef=c(0,1))
dev.off()
Testing for model assumptions (Stata codes)
NFIP policies-in-force
Unmatched data
Serial correlation
xtserial LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK COASTPOK MISS COAST CRS
EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 IN
C1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1993
Contemporaneous correlation
xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK COASTPOK MISS COAST CRS
EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN
ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1993, re
xtcsd, pesaran abs
heteroskedasticity
regress LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK COASTPOK MISS COAST CRS
EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN
ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1993
set matsize 1000
estat imtest, white
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Hauseman test between fixed and random
. xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK CRS EDU HH1000 INC1000
PPTMEANI TIME if YEAR>1993,fe
estimates store fixed
xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK CRS EDU HH1000 INC1000
PPTMEANI TIME if YEAR>1993,re
hausman fixed ., sigmamore
Matched
Serial correlation
xtserial LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK COASTPOK MISS COAST CRS
EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN
ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0
Contemporaneous correlation
xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK COASTPOK MISS COAST CRS
EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN
ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0 , re
xtcsd, pesaran abs
Heteroskedasticity
regress LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK COASTPOK MISS COAST CRS
EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN
ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0
.estat imtest, white
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Hausman test between fixed vs random effect
.xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK CRS EDU HH1000 INC1000
PPTMEANI TIME if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0 ,fe
estimates store fixed
.xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT TIMECRS CRSPOSTK CRS EDU HH1000 INC1000
PPTMEANI TIME if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3 >0,re
hausman fixed ., sigmamore
Damage claims payments
Unmatched
Serial correlation
xtserial LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993
Contemporaneous correlation
xtreg LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993, re
xtcsd, pesaran abs
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Heteroskedasticity
regress LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005
D2006 D2007 D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993
estat imtest, white
Hausman test between fixed-effect and random-effects
xtreg LOGCLAIM CRS EDU HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993, fe
estimates store fixed
xtreg LOGCLAIM CRS EDU HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993, re
hausman fixed ., sigmamore
Matched
Serial correlation
xtserial LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0

119

contemporaneous correlation
xtreg LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0, re
xtcsd, pesaran abs
Heteroskedasticity
regress LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0
estat imtest, white
Hausman test between fixed-effect and random-effects
xtreg LOGCLAIM CRS EDU HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0 , fe
estimates store fixed
xtreg LOGCLAIM CRS EDU HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & WVEC3>0 , re
hausman fixed ., sigmamore
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Claims greater than zero
Serial correlation
xtserial LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & LOGCLAIM>0
Heteroskedasticity
regress LOGCLAIM MISS COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES
HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & LOGCLAIM>0
estat imtest, white
Hausman Fixed vs Random-effects
xtreg LOGCLAIM CRS EDU HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & LOGCLAIM>0 , fe
estimates store fixed
xtreg LOGCLAIM CRS EDU HH1000 logCOVERAMT INC1000 PPTMEANI D1995
D1996 D1997 D1998 D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006 D2007
D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1993 & LOGCLAIM>0 , re
hausman fixed ., sigmamore
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Specific CRS mitigation activities
NFIP policies-in-force
Serial correlation
xtserial LOGPIF POSTKAT COASTPOK C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S
C410S C420S C430S C440S C450S C510S C520S C530S C540S C610S C630S MISS
COAST CRS EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 PPTMEANI
STRDMEAN ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1997
heteroskedasticity
regress LOGPIF POSTKAT COASTPOK C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S
C410S C420S C430S C440S C450S C510S C520S C530S C540S C610S C630S MISS
COAST EDU SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 PPTMEANI
STRDMEAN ELVMEAN TIME if YEAR>1997 & CRS>0
estat imtest, white
Hausman test between fixed vs random
xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S C410S C420S
C430S C440S C450S C510SC520S C530S C540S C610S C630S EDU HH1000
INC1000 PPTMEANI TIME if YEAR>1997 & CRS>0, fe
estimates store fixed
xtreg LOGPIF POSTKAT C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S C410S C420S
C430S C440S C450S C510S C520S C530S C540S C610S C630S EDU HH1000
INC1000 PPTMEANI TIME if YEAR>1997 & CRS>0, re
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Damage claims payments
Serial correlation
xtserial LOGCLAIM C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S C410S C420S C430S
C440S C450S C510S C520S C530S C540S C610S C630S MISS COAST EDU
SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 logCOVERAMT PPTMEANI
STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006
D2007 D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1997 & CRS>0
Heteroskedasticity
regress LOGCLAIM C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S C410S C420S C430S
C440S C450S C510S C520S C530S C540S C610S C630S MISS COAST EDU
SLPMEAN AVZONES BCZONES HH1000 INC1000 logCOVERAMT PPTMEANI
STRDMEAN ELVMEAN D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006
D2007 D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1997 & CRS>0.
estat imtest, white
Hausman test between randome vs fixed-effects
xtreg LOGCLAIM C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S C410S C420S C430S
C440S C450S C510S C520S C530S C540S C610S C630S EDU HH1000 INC1000
logCOVERAMT PPTMEANI D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006
D2007 D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1997 & CRS>0,fe
estimates store fixed
xtreg LOGCLAIM C310S C320S C330S C340S C350S C360S C410S C420S C430S
C440S C450S C510S C520S C530S C540S C610S C630S EDU HH1000 INC1000
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logCOVERAMT PPTMEANI D1999 D2000 D2001 D2002 D2003 D2004 D2005 D2006
D2007 D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 if YEAR>1997 & CRS>0,re
hausman fixed ., sigmamore
Empirical model estimations (NLOGIT Codes)
CRS participation
NFIP policies-in-force
Unmatched
Mundlak’s Random-effects
|-> NAMELIST
X=
time,timecrs,
CRS,MISS,COAST,AVZONES,BCZONES,SLPMEAN,ELVMEAN,STRDMEAN,EDU
,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI,postkat, crspostk,
coastpok,CRSMU,EDUMU,HHMU,INCMU,PPTMU,
$
|-> REGRESS
; Lhs=logPIF ; Rhs = one, X
; panel
; random
; robust
; Test: CRSMU = 0, EDUMU = 0,HHMU = 0,INCMU = 0,PPTMU = 0 ? Wu's Variable
Addition Test
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Fixed-effects
;sample; all $
;reject; year < 1994 $
;SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
time,timecrs,CRS,EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI,postkat,crspostk,
$
REGRESS
; Lhs=logPIF ; Rhs = one, X
; panel
; fixed
; robust
$
Matched
Mundlak’s Random-effects
sample; all $
reject; wvec3 = 0 $
reject; year < 1994 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
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;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
time, timecrs,
CRS,MISS,COAST,AVZONES,BCZONES,SLPMEAN,ELVMEAN,STRDMEAN,EDU
,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI,postkat,crspostk,coastpok,CRSMU,EDUMU,HHMU,IN
CMU,PPTMU,$
REGRESS
; Lhs=logPIF ; Rhs = one, X
; panel
; random
; robust
; wts = wvec3
; Test: CRSMU = 0, EDUMU = 0,HHMU = 0,INCMU = 0,PPTMU = 0 ? Wu's Variable
Addition Test
$
Fixed-effects
sample; all $
reject; wvec3 = 0 $
reject; year < 1994 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
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NAMELIST
;X=
time,timecrs,CRS, EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI,
postkat, crspostk,
$
REGRESS
Lhs=logPIF ; Rhs = one, X
; panel
; fixed
; robust
; wts = wvec3
$
Damage claims payments
Unmatched
Mundlak’s random-effects
sample; all $
reject; year < 1994 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
CRS,
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MISS,COAST, AVZONES,BCZONES, SLPMEAN,ELVMEAN,STRDMEAN
EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI, LOGCOVER,
D1995, D1996,D1997,D1998, D1999,D2000,D2001,D2002,D2003,D2004,D2005,
D2006,D2007,D2008,D2009,D2010,D2011,D2012,D2013,
CRSMU, EDUMU,HHMU,INCMU,PPTMU, covermu
$
REGRESS
;Lhs=logCLAIM ; Rhs = one, X
;panel
;random
;robust
;Test: CRSMU = 0, EDUMU = 0,HHMU = 0,INCMU = 0,PPTMU = 0,
covermu = 0 ? Wu's Variable Addition Test
$
Fixed-effects
sample; all $
reject; year < 1994 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
CRS,
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EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI, LOGCOVER,
D1995, D1996,D1997,D1998, D1999,D2000,D2001,D2002,D2003,D2004,D2005,
D2006,D2007,D2008,D2009,D2010,D2011,D2012,D2013,
$
REGRESS
;Lhs=logCLAIM ; Rhs = one, X
;panel
;fixed
;robust
$
Matched
Random-effects
sample; all $
reject; wvec3 = 0 $
reject; year < 1994 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
CRS,
MISS,COAST, AVZONES,BCZONES, SLPMEAN,ELVMEAN,STRDMEAN,
EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI, LOGCOVER,
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D1995, D1996,D1997,D1998, D1999,D2000,D2001,D2002,D2003,D2004,D2005,
D2006,D2007,D2008,D2009,D2010,D2011,D2012,D2013,
$
REGRESS
;Lhs=logCLAIM ; Rhs = one, X
;panel
;random
;robust
; wts = wvec3
$
Claims greater than zero
Mundlak
sample; all $
reject; year < 1994 $
reject ;logCLAIM = 0 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
CRS,
MISS,COAST, AVZONES,BCZONES, SLPMEAN,ELVMEAN,STRDMEAN,
EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI, LOGCOVER,
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D1995, D1996,D1997,D1998, D1999,D2000,D2001,D2002,D2003,D2004,D2005,
D2006,D2007,D2008,D2009,D2010,D2011,D2012,D2013,
CRSMU, EDUMU,HHMU,INCMU,PPTMU, covermu
$
REGRESS
;Lhs=logCLAIM ; Rhs = one, X
;panel
;random
;robust
;Test: CRSMU = 0, EDUMU = 0,HHMU = 0,INCMU = 0,PPTMU = 0,
covermu = 0 ? Wu's Variable Addition Test
$
Fixed-effects
sample; all $
reject; year < 1994 $
reject ;logCLAIM = 0 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
CRS,
EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI, LOGCOVER,
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D1995, D1996,D1997,D1998, D1999,D2000,D2001,D2002,D2003,D2004,D2005,
D2006,D2007,D2008,D2009,D2010,D2011,D2012,D2013,
$
REGRESS
;Lhs=logCLAIM ; Rhs = one, X
;panel
;fixed
;robust
Specific CRS activities
NFIP policies-in-force
Mundlak’s random-effects
sample; all $
reject; year < 1998 $
reject; crs = 0 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
time,
c310s,c320s,c330s,c340s,c350s,c360s,c410s,c420s,c430s,c440s,c450s,
c510s,c520s,c530s,c540s,c610s,c630s,MISS,COAST,AVZONES,BCZONES,SLPMEA
N,ELVMEAN,STRDMEAN,EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI,postkat,
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coastpok,c310mu,c320mu,c330mu,c340mu,c350mu,c360mu,c410mu,c420mu,c430mu,c4
40mu,c450mu,c510mu,c520mu,c530mu,c540mu,c610mu,c630mu,EDUMU,HHMU,INU
,PPTMU,
$
REGRESS
; Lhs=logPIF
; Rhs = one, X
; panel
; random
; robust
;Test: c310mu = 0, c320mu = 0, c330mu = 0, c340mu = 0, c350mu =
0,c360mu=0,c410mu =0,c420mu =0,c430mu =0,c440mu =0,c450mu =0,
c510mu=0,c520mu =0,c530mu =0,c540mu =0,c610mu =0,c630mu =0,EDUMU =
0,HHMU = 0,INCMU = 0,PPTMU = 0 ? Wu's Variable Addition Test
$
Fixed-effects
sample; all $
reject; year < 1998 $
reject; crs = 0 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
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;X=
time, c310s,c320s,c330s,c340s,c350s,c360s,c410s,c420s,c430s,c440s,c450s,
c510s,c520s,c530s,c540s,c610s,c630s, EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI, postkat,
$
REGRESS
; Lhs=logPIF ; Rhs = one, X
; panel
; fixed
; robust
$
Damage claims payments
Pooled model
sample; all $
reject; year < 1998 $
reject; crs = 0 $
SETPANEL
; Group = CID1
;Pds=ti $
NAMELIST
;X=
c310s,c320s,c330s,c340s,c350s,c360s, c410s,c420s,c430s,c440s,c450s,
c510s,c520s,c530s,c540s,c610s,c630s,
MISS,COAST, AVZONES,BCZONES, SLPMEAN,ELVMEAN,STRDMEAN,
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EDU,HH1000,INC1000,PPTMEANI, LOGCOVER,
D1999,D2000,D2001,D2002,D2003,D2004,D2005,
D2006,D2007,D2008,D2009,D2010,D2011,D2012,D2013,
$
REGRESS
; Lhs=logCLAIM ; Rhs = one, X
; panel
; pooled
$
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